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Abstract 
Antitrust  law is moving away from rules (ex ante, limited factor 
liability determinants) and toward standards (ex post, multi-factor liability 
determinants).  This movement has important consequences for the 
structure of antitrust adjudication, including shifting ultimate decision-
making down the legal hierarchy (in the direction of juries, trial courts 
sitting as fact-finders, and administrative agencies) and increasing the 
importance of economic experts.  The efficiency consequences of this trend 
are often negative.  Specifying liability determinants as open-ended, 
unpredictable standards increases litigation costs, chills socially beneficial 
industrial practices, allocates decision-making on microeconomic policy to 
unqualified juries, and facilitates strategic misuse of antitrust litigation by 
rent-seeking competitors.  Instead of following a generalized preference for 
standards, courts should consider five factors in choosing the ex ante 
precision of liability determinants: (1) whether the lawsuit was brought by 
the government or a private party; (2) whether the legal determinant would 
create liability or immunize against it; (3) whether the remedy sought is 
prospective (i.e., injunctive) or retrospective (i.e., damages); (4) whether 
the conduct is idiosyncratic or paradigmatic; and (5) whether the 
misconduct alleged is collusion or exclusion.  A standard-based approach is 
most appropriate to create liability in public litigation seeking injunctive 
relief against idiosyncratic practices.  A rule-based approach is most 
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appropriate when used to immunize archetypal forms of industrial behavior 
from private actions for damages.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
Antitrust law finds itself in the midst of a creeping transition from rules 
to standards.  Adjudicatory categories that have long held sway—such as 
the dichotomy between the per se rule and the rule of reason for 
collaborative conduct or categorical rules of liability and immunity in 
monopolization law—are progressively being replaced by open-ended 
balancing of market values.  As antitrust has become de-politicized and de-
ideologized, flexible technocratic expertise has replaced legalist 
conceptualism.  Once the stars of the antitrust courtroom, lawyers now play 
the supporting cast to economists.  Economic theory and post-hoc, 
contextual examination of facts rather than a priori legal categories take 
center stage in antitrust proceedings.  Gone are the days when the Supreme 
Court advocated stark antitrust rules and condemned “rambl[ing] through 
the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach.”1
The wilds are being tamed, and adjudicatory flexibility favored. 
Why this transition?  The Chicago School’s dramatic influence on 
antitrust law since the mid-1970s accounts for a significant part of the story.  
Economic theory has rehabilitated practices once condemned as per se 
illegal because courts thought it a waste of time to see whether that conduct 
might be justified by efficiency considerations.2 Full-blown review of the 
context and motivation of practices once viewed as necessarily 
anticompetitive often reveals that they are competitively benign.3 Yet the 
 
* Assistant Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva 
University.  B.A. Wheaton College; J.D. University of Chicago. 
1 U.S. v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 569, 609 n.10 (1972). 
2 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 925 (1979); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. 
Rev. 213 (1985).  The Supreme Court has described its per se approach in antitrust 
as “reflect[ing] broad generalizations holding true in so many cases that inquiry 
into whether they apply to the case at hand would be needless and wasteful.”  
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2002). 
3 For example, vertical maximum resale price setting by upstream firms was once 
condemned as per se unlawful.  Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).  In 
1997, the Supreme Court held that Albrecht had been mistaken and that the flexible 
rule of reason should apply instead.  State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997).  
Since State Oil, plaintiffs appear to have had a hard time establishing that 
maximum retail price setting has anticompetitive effects.  See, e.g., Mathias v. 
2006]  Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication  3
3
move toward greater adjudicatory flexibility—the move from rules to 
standards—cannot be attributed solely to a less interventionist preference.  
In recent years, the growing inclination toward fulsome review of the facts 
has led a number of courts to reject bright-line rules that would have 
immunized defendants from liability.  In monopolization cases, in 
particular, prominent decisions have emphasized the need to consider the 
fullness of the defendant’s conduct on a case-by-case basis, thus denying 
defendants the sort of categorical legal rules most helpful for averting jury 
trials.4 The move toward standards, it appears, has been motivated in part 
by a sense that antitrust cases are too complex and socially important to 
turn on simplistic legalist commands. 
If history is a reliable teacher, the pendulum will eventually swing back 
toward rules.  Morris Cohen once noted that “periodic waves of reform 
during which the sense of justice, natural law, or equity introduces life and 
flexibility into the law and makes it adjustable to its work” are often 
followed by periods where “under the social demand for certainty, equity 
gets hardened and reduced to rigid rules.”5 Similarly, Carol Rose has 
documented a tendency in property law to “shift back and forth between 
hard-edged, yes-or-no crystalline rules and discretion-laden, post hoc 
muddy rules.”6 Whatever the perceived advantages of standards over rules 
in antitrust, the disadvantages of standards will probably induce a counter-
movement back toward rules once the current movement has run its course.   
This is not to say that a rules-standards-rules-standards cycle is 
inevitable.  Certain fields lend themselves primarily to rules (tax comes to 
mind)7 and others lend themselves more to standards (constitutional law 
 
Daily News, L.P., 152 F.Supp.2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  Similarly, the Supreme 
Court once believed that tying could “serve hardly any purpose beyond the 
suppression of competition,” Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 
U.S. 293, 306 (1949), but subsequent learning has shown that tying has many 
procompetitive purposes.  David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms 
Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying 
Law, 22 Yale J. Reg. 37 (2005); Benjamin Klein, Tying, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, vol. 3, p. 630 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998). 
4 See infra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx. 
5 MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 261 (1933). 
6 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 590 
(1988). 
7 See Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 859 (1982). 
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comes to mind, although less obviously).8 Other fields settle on a mixture 
between rules and standards, thus preventing “crystals and mud” cycles.9
There is wisdom in seeking such balance.  As Richard Posner has aptly 
observed, “no sensible person supposes that rules are always superior to 
standards, or vice versa.”10 Antitrust law is a good case in point.   Neither a 
completely rule-based nor standard-based juridical structure would 
adequately promote competitive and efficient economic markets. 
In this article, I argue against wholesale abandonment of rules in 
antitrust, which appears to be where prevailing currents are taking us.  Part 
of my argument follows familiar lines from the “rules versus standards” 
literature,11 such as the trade-offs between precision and predictability and 
 
8 But see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Laws as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1175 (1989).  
9 See Rose, supra n. xxx. 
10 MindGames, Inc. v. Western Pub. Co., Inc., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000). 
11 A litany of the leading generalist literature on the “rules versus standards” 
question includes P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN 
ANGLE-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL 
THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987);  KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) (primarily chapters one and two); 
HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 155-58 (tent. ed. 
1958); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); 
Anthony I. Ogus, Quantitative Rules and Judicial Decision Making, in  THE 
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 210 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 
1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-53 (1990); 
ROSCO POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 48-71 (1922); 
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 
OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND LIFE (1991); ROBERTO UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 88-100 (1975); ); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal 
Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65 (1983); Ronald M. Dworkin, 
The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14, 22-29 (1967); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 
(1974); Jason S. Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J. L. 
Econ. & Org. 256 (1995); Louis Kaplow, A Model of Optimal Complexity of Legal 
Rules, 11 J. L. & Econ. Org. 150 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L. J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Russell B. 
Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 
Or. L. Rev. 23 (2000); Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different 
Systems of Law, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 475, 482-87 (1933); Eric A. Posner, Standards, 
Rules, and Social Norms, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 101 (1997); Pierre J. Schlag, 
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The 
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the costs of promulgating legal commands based on the frequency of the 
regulated conduct.  But antitrust has unique features—such as the treble 
damages remedy, the close proximity of socially beneficial and harmful 
behavior, and the propensity of competitors to misuse antitrust lawsuits for 
strategic advantage—that require an expanded set of considerations when it 
comes to the precision of liability determinants. Given the peculiarities of 
antitrust, the optimal choice between rules and standards depends on a 
variety of factors.  I identify five such factors that should influence the 
choice between rules and standards as to different types of industrial 
behavior and different types of proceedings and parties.  In rough order of 
importance, they are: (1) whether the lawsuit was brought by the 
government or a private party; (2) whether the legal determinant would 
create liability or immunize against it; (3) whether the remedy sought is 
prospective (i.e., injunctive) or retrospective (i.e., damages); (4) whether 
the conduct is idiosyncratic or paradigmatic; and (5) whether the 
misconduct alleged is collusion or exclusion.  A standard-based approach is 
most appropriate to create liability in public litigation seeking injunctive 
relief against an idiosyncratic practice.  A rule-based approach is most 
appropriate when used to immunize archetypal forms of industrial behavior 
from private actions for damages.  
Part I of this article summarizes the progression that antitrust law has 
made and is making from a system mixing rules and standards to one in 
which rules are increasing disfavored and standards favored.  Part II asks 
whether rules are really possible or whether even those legal commands 
framed as rules inevitably dissolve into standards.  It concludes that, in 
antitrust at least, important consequences follow from the designation of 
liability and adjudicative criteria as either rules or standards.  Part III 
considers the efficiency implications of antitrust rules and standards. It 
argues for an approach sensitive to the nature of the plaintiff (i.e., public or 
private) and the nature of the remedy sought (i.e., injunction or damages) 
and to whether the legal expression would create or prevent liability.  
Finally, Part IV  considers some non-efficiency based criteria for choosing 
between rules and standards, such ideologically oriented objections to either 
rules or standards and the value of maintaining a short set of foundational 
antitrust rules in order to maintain the expressive core of antitrust law and 
orient the public toward the meaning of this often ill-understood enterprise. 
 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 956-57 (1995). 
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I. THE PROGRESSION FROM RULES TO STANDARDS 
Antitrust law has never been, and could not be, an exclusively rule-
based system.12 It governs too vast and complex an array of business 
practices to be reduced to a handful of categorical rules.  Yet rules— 
specifications of liability criteria in formal, seemingly precise, and usually 
short directives13—have made up a significant part of antitrust law for a 
good bit of the Sherman Act’s interpretive history.  In the not too distant 
past, it was possible to describe much of antitrust law in categorical terms, 
both in terms of what was categorically prohibited and what was 
categorically allowed.   
This is changing, although not primarily through Supreme Court 
leadership.  The Rehnquist court was largely uninterested in antitrust, 
granting certiorari in few antitrust cases that raised issues of substance.14 In 
 
12 Richard Epstein imagines the possibility of antitrust fitting within his preferred 
paradigm of a few simple rules for a complex world.  Epstein, supra note xxxx at 
123-27.  As discussed below in Section IV(A), however, what Epstein imagines is 
not so much rule-based antitrust as much less antitrust. 
13 I do not mean to try and add to the jurisprudential debate over what is a rule and 
what is a standard.  The general properties of liability criteria that are more rule-
like (i.e., do not drive over 55 miles an hour; pay at a marginal rate of 33%; a 
Senator must be 35 years old) and standards (i.e., good faith; negligence; 
unconscionably; undue burden; proportionality) are fairly apparent, although as 
with virtually any category, they tend to fray at the margins.  See Duncan, supra n. 
xxx at 1688. 
14 During its 19 year, the Rehnquist Court decided only 11 cases involving issues of 
substantive antitrust law.  See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 
U.S. 756 (1999); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); State Oil v. 
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997; Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 
(1993); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992);  
Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 
496 U.S. 543 (1990); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 
(1990);  Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 
(1988).  See generally Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Business Power in THE 
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (Herman Schwartz, ed. 
2002) (providing a critical analysis of the Rehnquist Court’s antitrust jurisprudence 
and expressing relief that the Court did not take more antitrust cases).  It remains to 
be seen whether the Roberts court—led by a Chief Justice whose spent a good bit 
of time in private practice on antitrust matters—will take a greater interest.  For his 
part, Justice Alito has signaled a low degree of interest in antitrust.  See Hearing on 
the Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court, 109th Cong. 
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the few substantive antitrust cases it decided, the Rehnquist court 
sometimes followed a rule-based approach, particularly with respect to 
exclusionary practices where it seemed concerned about the deleterious 
effects on incentives to compete of open-ended, unpredictable standards.15 
But the Supreme Court simply has not decided enough antitrust cases in 
recent years to permit a broad generalization about its direction. With the 
Supreme Court rarely intervening, a movement away from rules and toward 
standards has been carried out by the lower courts and antitrust enforcement 
agencies, which have followed an impulse to manage antitrust adjudication 
in a more multi-factor, fact-dependent, and ex post way than under the older 
rule-based model. 
A. Collusion 
Any student of U.S. antitrust doctrine in the past half-century quickly 
learned that restraints of trade fall into two categories—(1) those that are 
per se illegal; and (2) those that require examination under the rule of 
reason.16 The rule of reason is, for present purposes, a misnomer, since it is 
theoretically at least more standard-like than rule-like.17 Under the classic 
Chicago Board of Trade formulation,18 conduct falling within the rule of 
reason must be examined under a wide range of criteria, including the 
structure of the relevant industry, the justifications for the restraint, and its 
effects on prices and output levels.  On the other hand, conduct falling 
within the per se rule is absolutely prohibited.  Antitrust doctrine curtails 
inquiry into the reasons for the conduct, the market power of the firm 
engaging in the conduct, and the desirability of the conduct from a 
consumer welfare perspective.19 
The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Topco20 represents the high 
water mark of the absolutist nature of the per se rule.  The defendants were 
 
(2006) (Statement of Sen. Mike Dewine on Antitrust Issues), available at 2006 WL 
53273. 
15 See infra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx. 
16 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF 
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK §§ 5.3c-5.3f at 192-217 (2000). 
17 I say “theoretically at least” because, as discussed below, the rule of reason often 
resulted in fairly summary adjudication for the defendant.  In Section I(A) below, I 
consider the possibility that the rule of reason was once fairly rule-like in 
application. 
18 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
19 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
20 U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
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small regional grocers that formed a buying cooperative to create a private 
label brand—Topco—in order to compete more effectively with large 
national grocery chains.  In order to prevent free-riding on local-market 
promotion of the Topco brand, the participating grocers agreed to a system 
of exclusive territories.21 When the federal government challenged the 
Topco exclusivity system as a per se illegal market division agreement, the 
district court made a series of “dream” findings for an antitrust defendant:  
Topco’s members had no market power; the exclusivity system was 
supported by legitimate free-riding concerns; the exclusivity system would 
strengthen the Topco grocers and make them more efficient competitors 
with the large national grocery chains; and enjoining operation of the Topco 
exclusivity system would actually diminish competition in the grocery 
business because it would make the dominant national chains even more 
dominant.22 As Justice Blackmun lamented in dissent, the effect of 
enjoining the exclusivity system would be that “the bigs . . . should find it 
easier to get bigger.”23
Without denying the validity of any of the district court’s findings, 
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Supreme Court nonetheless reversed the 
district court’s opinion approving the Topco exclusivity system.  His 
opinion dismisses the possibility of a balancing, post-hoc approach to 
antitrust adjudication.  The problems with such an approach include 
institutional incompetence to engage in meaningful fact-specific balancing 
(“The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult 
economic problems”),24 loss of ex ante predictability for the subjects of the 
legal regime (“Without the per se rules, businessmen would be left with 
little to aid them in predicting in any particular case what courts will find to 
be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act”),25 and general distrust of 
economic theory (“Should Congress ultimately determine that predictability 
 
21 On the free-riding concerns that motivated the exclusivity system in Topco, see 
Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 
5, 70-71 (2004).  But see Robert Pitofsky, Joint Venture Guidelines: Views from 
One of the Drafters, Speech before ABA Antitrust Section Workshop: Joint 
Ventures and Strategic Alliances: The New Federal Antitrust Competitor 
Collaboration Guidelines 5 (Nov. 11, 1999) <http:// 
www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/jvg991111.htm> (questioning whether Topco 
exclusivity system was necessary to prevent free-riding). 
22 United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1033, 1040, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 
1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
23 Topco, 405 U.S. at 612 
24 405 U.S. at 609. 
25 Id. at 609 n.10. 
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is unimportant in this area of the law, it can, of course, make per se rules 
inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to ramble through 
the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach”).26 
Although the law of collaborative conduct was often presented as a 
dualism between the rule of reason and the per se rule,27 there was actually 
a third category that also appeared in rule-like form:  per se legality.  For 
example, under the venerable Colgate doctrine,28 a manufacturer was free 
to announce a suggested retail price (“MSRP”) and then refuse 
prospectively to do business with any retailer that deviated from the MSRP.  
Although it would not take any great stretch of legal reasoning or the 
English language to imagine such conduct as an agreed-upon restraint of 
trade,29 the Supreme Court (influenced by the property rights and freedom 
of contract formalist ideology of the Lochner era)30 permitted such use of 
MSRPs as an absolute right.  But because setting of retail prices by 
agreement was (and still is to some extent) per se illegal,31 a manufacturer 
who deviated ever so slightly from the simple model of announcing an 
MSRP and cutting off any cheating retailer would lose the Colgate 
privilege and find itself within the per se rule.32 This doctrinal dualism 
caused radical swings between the poles of per se legality and illegality 
based on slight differences in the challenged conduct.33 
26 Id. 
27 See Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(describing traditional “dichotomous categorical approach” in Section 1 cases). 
28 U.S. v. Colgate & Co., & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
29 Under traditional contract law doctrine, a unilateral contract is formed by a 
promisee’s performance of a requested act.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
45 (1982).  If a manufacturer announces an MSRP and a retailer acquiesces by 
selling the product at that price, a unilateral contract has been formed in 
conventional terms.  In other contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized that an 
invitation to collude followed by unspoken acquiescence meets the threshold 
requirement of a “contract, combination, or conspiracy.”  Interstate Circuit. 
30 Edward P. Krugman, Soap, Cream of Wheat and Bakeries: The Intellectual 
Origins of the Colgate Doctrine, 65 St. John’s L. Rev. 827 (1991). 
31 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); c.f. 
State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997).   
32 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Albrecht v. Herald & 
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
33 In Albrecht, for instance, the defendant’s only deviation from privileged exercise 
of its Colgate rights was that it integrated forward into distribution and hired 
another person to deliver newspapers on the terminated distributor’s old routes.  
390 U.S. at 147-48. 
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In recent years, there has been a marked transition away from rules and 
toward standards in collaborative conduct cases.  This occurred in an 
obvious way beginning in the 1970s as the Burger and then Rehnquist 
courts overruled Warren court precedents that had condemned a variety of 
business agreements as per se illegal.  As common business practices such 
as vertical territorial allocations,34 maximum resale price setting,35
expulsions of members from industry associations,36 and a manufacturer’s 
acquiescence in a retailer’s demand to terminate a competing retailer that 
was deviating from the manufacturer’s MSRP37 went from the per se rule to 
the rule of reason, the domain of rules shrunk and the domain of standards 
grew.  Significantly, the Court declined the Chicago School’s call to move 
vertical restraints from per se illegality to per se legality.  In State Oil,
Justice O’Connor—who is also fond of balancing tests in constitutional 
law38—went out of her way to make clear that the Court was not holding 
“that all vertical maximum price fixing is per se lawful.”39 Vertical 
restraints would still require scrutiny, but under the multi-factored rule of 
reason. 
The transition from rules to standards did not take place solely due to a 
juridical shift of particular business practices from one category to another.  
Instead, the entire judicial rhetoric of antitrust has moved in a more 
nuanced, standard-based direction over the past few decades.  With few 
exceptions,40 the courts have stopped creating new categories of per se 
 
34 Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) and 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
35 See supra n. xxx. 
36 Compare Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 
(1961) and Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing 
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). 
37 Compare  Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) and 
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).  In 
Sharp, the Court denied that it was overruling Klors, which it characterized as a 
horizontal case because  Broadway Hale had gotten its suppliers to agree among 
themselves not to supply Klors.  However, the horizontal aspects of the case were 
certainly not stressed in Klors and the Sharp distinction has the effect of essentially 
limiting Klors to its facts.     
38 See Suzanna Sherry, The Unmaking of a Precedent, 55 S. Ct. Rev. 231 (2003). 
39 State Oil, 522 U.S. at 22; c.f. Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust 
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1981) 
(arguing for per se legality for most vertical restraints). 
40 Although the Supreme Court has not created a new per se illegal category in a 
very long time, a lower court will occasionally stretch the bounds of the per se rule 
to encompass a new practice.  See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 
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illegal conduct, even though commercial circumstances and practices 
evolve over time and litigation frequently explores new areas of 
commercial behavior.  Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court seems to 
have frozen the canon of per se illegal practices, without necessarily 
pushing all other behavior into rule of reason.  Instead, arguably beginning 
with National Society of Professional Engineer v. FTC41 in 1978, the Court 
adopted what came later to be known as the “Quick Look” approach.  In 
subsequent cases like NCAA v. Board of Regents42 and California Dental v. 
FTC,43 the Court described the Quick Look approach as involving an initial 
determination by the court, based on a “rudimentary understanding of 
economics,” that the practice at issue has obvious anticompetitive effects, 
which puts the defendant to the burden of immediately putting forth a 
procompetitive justification for the practice.44 
The quick look approach could be nothing more than an initial triaging 
tool to decide whether the particular practice falls into the per se rule or the 
rule of reason, but its effects on antitrust doctrine have been more 
transformative.  Although the Supreme Court has only hinted in this 
 
(6th Cir. 2003) (holding per se illegal an agreement between a branded 
pharmaceutical firm and a generic pharmaceutical firm that the generic firm would 
not produce a drug allegedly infringing the branded firm’s patent during the 
pendency of the infringement litigation); but see In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust 
Litigation, 429 F.3d 370 (2005); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 
(2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); 
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d 188 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (all evaluating such settlements under the rule of reason); see 
generally Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements, in ISSUES 
IN COMPETITION POLICY (Dale Collins, ed., forthcoming 2006). 
41 National Society of Professional Engineers v. FTC, 435 U.S.679 (1978).  In 
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit 
described Professional Engineers as the last of the dualist cases.  But see text 
accompanying notes xxx – xxx, describing later cases in which the Supreme Court 
mechanically applied the per se rule. 
42 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
43 California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
44 On the quick look, see Max R. Shulman, The Quick Look Rule of Reason:  
Retreat from Binary Antitrust Analysis, 2 Sedona Conf. J. 89 (2001); Alan J. 
Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look:  Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule 
of Reason, 68 Antitrust L. J. 461 (2000); Stephen Calkins, California Dental 
Association:  Not a Quick Look but not the Full Monty, 67 Antitrust L. J. 495 
(2000); James A. Keyte, What Is It and How Is It Being Applied:  The Quick Look 
Rule of Reason, 11-SUM Antitrust 21 (1997); Kathleen E. McDermott, A Quick 
Look at the “Quick Look,” 5-SPG Antitrust 32 (1991). 
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direction,45 the Federal Trade Commission and some federal appellate 
courts have explicitly read the quick look cases, in combination with the 
“characterization” cases discussed in the next section, to have broken down 
the entire dualistic structure of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  In its recent 
Polygram decision, the D.C. Circuit reported:  “The Supreme Court’s 
approach to evaluating a § 1 claim has gone through a transition over the 
last twenty-five years, from a dichotomous categorical approach to a more 
nuanced and case-specific inquiry.”46 
Polygram was an appeal of a decision by the Federal Trade 
Commission finding illegal an agreement between Polygram Records and 
Warner Music with respect to the marketing of recordings of live concerns 
by the famed “Three Tenors” (José Carreras, Placido Domingo, and 
Luciano Pavarotti).  Polygram had distribution rights to the original 1990 
Three Tenors recording and Warner had rights to the second (1994) Three 
Tenors recording.47 In 1998, the Three Tenors made a third recording and 
Warner and Polygram agreed to distribute it jointly.  Ostensibly so as to 
avoid free-riding on their joint promotional activities, the distributors 
agreed that they would each forgo promoting the earlier two albums for a 
six-week period during which the 1998 album was going to be heavily 
promoted.48 
The Federal Trade Commission’s staff challenged the “moratorium” 
agreement as anticompetitive,49 and the administrative law judge, the 
 
45 See California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (“The truth 
is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms 
like “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule of reason” tend to make them appear.”). 
46 Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (2005). 
47 Id. at 31. 
48 Id. at 32. 
49 Although the FTC challenged the practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act and 
not Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the agency and the courts treated the analysis 
under both statutes as identical.  See 416 F.3d at 32 (observing that that the FTC 
was correct in observing “that the analysis under § 5 of the FTC Act is the same in 
this case as it would be under § 1 of the Sherman Act).  This point is significant for 
present purposes because the Supreme Court has ruled that the FTC may have more 
prophylactic flexibility under the FTC Act than either the Department of Justice or 
a private litigant would have under the Sherman Act.  See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,
384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966); F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-
395 (1953).  However, the fact that both the FTC and the D.C. Circuit equated the 
analysis under the two statutes and relied interchangeably on Supreme Court cases 
involving the FTC and private litigants indicates that the approach to collaborative 
conduct outlined in Polygram and similar FTC decisions is not limited to public 
enforcement. 
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Commission itself, and the D.C. Circuit all agreed that it was.  Following 
the rule-based system, the analysis could have been quite short.  As the ALJ 
found (and the Commission, at least, agreed), the agreement not to discount 
the separate products marketed by the joint venturers outside the joint 
venture was “simply a form of price fixing.”50 In conventional terms, that 
would have meant per se condemnation, without considering the reasons for 
the agreement, whether defendants had market power, whether there were 
anticompetitive effects, and other rule of reason factors.  Yet both the 
Commission and the D.C. Circuit went out of their way to stress that they 
were not evaluating the restraint in any fixed category, because fixed 
categories are no longer in vogue.  As the D.C. Circuit explained, it would 
be mistaken to think of the quick look approach as merely a new antitrust 
category—as though “the Court has moved from a dichotomy to a 
trichotomy”51—when in fact the question is always “whether . . . the 
challenged restraint enhances competition.”52 
To put it that way is to take the law of collaborative restraints out of 
rules and place it squarely into a flexible, post-hoc framework.  Although a 
reticulated burden-shifting framework remains in place,53 it is procedural 
and flexible rather than substantive and rigid.  Rather than specifying ex 
ante rules of conduct, it allocates burdens of proof and persuasion within 
the litigation:  Step One:  The judge or agency considers whether the 
restraint obviously harms consumers; Step Two:  If so, the judge or agency 
concludes that the practice does presumptively harm consumers, the 
defendant must come forward with a plausible and legally cognizable 
efficiency justification; Step Three:  If the defendant does, the burden shifts 
back to the agency to address the justification, in one of two ways; and so 
forth.54 This approach captures the values of a standard (flexibility, ex post 
policy-making, fact-specificity, object-dependence) and eschews the values 
of a rule (predictability, ex ante policy-making, category generality, 
subject-dependence). 
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will ultimately accept 
that its precedents signaled an end to doctrinal dichotomy, trichotomy, or 
any other discrete categorization and an opening to the incremental 
 
50 In re Polygram Holdings, Inc., Docket No. 9298, 2003 WL 21770765, at * xxx 
(FTC July 24, 2003). 
51 416 F.3d at 35. 
52 Id. (citing California Dental, 536 U.S. at 779-80). 
53 The FTC traces this approach back to its decision in In re Massachusetts Bd.  of 
Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988). 
54 416 F.3d at 35-36. 
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continualism adopted by the Polygram court.55 However, signs abound that 
the law of collaborative restraints of trade is collapsing from both of its 
rule-bound poles—per se legality and per se illegality—toward a flexible 
center.  Not only are practices like the no-discounting agreement in 
Polygram that once would have been condemned as per se illegal now 
adjudged under a more nuanced standard, but practices that might have 
been rubber-stamped as acceptable under older rule of reason jurisprudence 
are receiving a more thorough investigation under a reinvigorated rule of 
reason. 
At the outset of this section, I said that the rule of reason was 
“theoretically at least” a more fact-intensive, multi-factor approach than the 
per se rule.  The caveat was necessary because many scholars believe that 
categorization of a practice into the rule of reason once meant virtual per se 
legality.  During the earlier years of the Chicago revolution, Richard Posner 
offered that “the content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in 
practice, it is little more than a euphemism for nonliability,”56 and during its 
 
55 The Court will have a further opportunity to reveal its direction when it rules in 
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, U.S. N. 04-814, which concerns the question of whether a 
joint venture that unifies its marketing and production functions but continues to 
sell separately through its joint venturers and sets a uniform price for the individual 
joint venturer’s sales has committed a per se illegal price-fix. 
56 Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections 
on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1977).  More recent 
assessments along the same lines include Mark E. Roszkowski, State Oil Company 
v. Khan and the Rule of Reason:  The End of Intrabrand Competition? 66 Antitrust 
L.J. 613, 638 (1998) (“There is no justifiable reason for the rule of reason to be the 
‘defendant always wins’ non-standard sanctioned by the Chicago School.”); 
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to 
Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685, 685 (1991)  (“The rule of reason and per 
se approaches have been so divergent that a court’s choice of one analysis over the 
other will usually determine the outcome of an antitrust case. Traditionally, the rule 
of reason has meant a decision for the defendant and the per se rule a victory for 
the plaintiff.”); Deborah A. Widiss, Uneasy Labeling, 107 Yale L.J. 1529, 1529 
(1998) (“In theory, rule-of-reason analysis requires a careful examination of the 
competitive impact of a specific agreement; in practice, however, the challenged 
agreement is rarely struck down.”); Joe Sims, Developments in Agreements Among 
Competitors, 58 Antitrust L.J. 433, 435 (1989)  (”If it was per se illegal the 
plaintiffs won; if it was rule of reason the defendants won; and all you had to do 
was put it in the right box. For those who like bright-line rules, this was perfect.”);  
Albert A. Foer, The Political-Economic Nature of Antitrust, 27 St. Louis U. L.J. 
331, 337-38 (1983) (“With only slight exaggeration, there is really only one thing 
one needs to know about the rule of reason: when the rule is applied, the defendant 
virtually always wins.”); see also, Discon, Inc. v. Nynex Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1059 
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later years Frank Easterbrook offered that adjudication under the rule of 
reason meant “as a practical matter meant that [the challenged practices] 
were declared lawful per se.”57 This may have been a bit of an 
overstatement, since, focusing even on just the Supreme Court precedents, 
defendants have lost some significant rule of reason cases.58 Still, the 
assessment that rule of reason often came close to a rule of per se legality 
was not far off the mark, especially in cases involving vertical restraints.59 
In recent years, even as the per se rule has moved toward a more 
flexible balancing approach, the rule of reason seems to have become 
reinvigorated.  Important cases like Visa60 have found business practices to 
be in violation of the rule of reason, resulting in billions of dollars of 
payments to consumers and sometimes radical restructuring of industry 
practices.  Some lesser known decisions have also held that particular 
business practices failed the rule of reason.61 At the same time, the 
venerable Colgate rule categorically privileging firms to announce in 
advance the criteria they will use to choose upstream or downstream 
business partners appears to be gradually dissolving into a more flexible 
middle ground between per se legality and per se illegality.  Judicial 
decisions have found ways to narrow the Colgate “right” without casting 
the conduct into the opposite pole of per se illegality.62 
(2d. Cir. 1996), decision vacated Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998 
(”[T]he initial categorization  is often outcome determinative.”). 
57 Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 Geo. L.J. 
305, 305 (1987). 
58 United States v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945), 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).  
59 See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints:  De Facto Legality Under the 
Rule of Reason, 60 Antitrust L. J. 67, 71 (1992) (reporting that defendants have 
won over 90% of rule of reason decisions in vertical nonprice cases since Sylvania)
60 U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).  In the settlement to the 
private lawsuits following the Justice Department action, Visa settled for $2 billion 
and Mastercard for $1 billion. See Lawyers Seek $609 Million Fee for Negotiating 
Deal for Retailers with Visa and Mastercard, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2003, at C4. 
61See Telecor Com’n, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,305 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 
2002); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000); Law v. Nat. 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,  134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); Harolds Stores, Inc. v. 
Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533 (10th Cir. 1996). 
62 See, e.g., Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 427 F.3d 
1008, 1013 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that manufacturer’s refusal to do business with 
service provider was “per se legal, because a ‘manufacturer has a right to select its 
customers and refuse to sell its goods to anyone, for reasons sufficient to itself,’ ” 
but then holding that the service provider “is required to establish the 
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In sum, the law of collaborative restraints of trade is collapsing from 
both of its poles—per se legality and per se illegality—into a broad middle 
ground where nothing is prejudged and everything is negotiable in 
litigation.   
B. Exclusion 
It is more difficult to tell a strong “before and after” rules versus 
standards story with respect to exclusionary practices than it is with respect 
to the law of voluntary restraints.  Monopolization law has always been 
more flexible and fact-sensitive.  This is partly because Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act gives a clear target for adjudication—a “contract, 
combination, or conspiracy” that, juridically, must be the subject of the 
court’s inquiry.  Section 2, by contrast, contains no clear target since all of a 
firm’s amorphous conduct may be relevant to answering the question 
whether it unlawfully monopolized.  A strenuous debate is presently stirring 
in antitrust circles about how to conceptualize the monopolization offense.63 
After over a century of Sherman Act development, we still are not clear on 
the organizing principles of exclusionary practices law. 
Yet it is not difficult to locate a variety of actual or potential rules, both 
imposing liability and immunizing against it, in the arena of exclusionary 
practices.  Examples include: (1) no above-cost price can be called 
predatory;64 (2) pricing below cost is conclusively presumed predatory;65 
(3) patents are presumed to confer market power and requiring customers to 
purchase a separate item if they want to purchase the patented item amounts 
to per se illegal tying;66 (4) no firm with a market share of less than 50% 
 
unreasonableness of the alleged trade restraint”); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 
F.3d 928, 939-40 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Toys “R” Us did not have a Colgate 
right to encourage its suppliers not to sell certain toys to “club” retailers and 
affirming the evaluation of such restraints under the Rule of Reason). 
63 See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare,
56 Emory L. J. xxx (2006); Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act:  
The Search for Standards, 93 Geo. L.J. 1623 (2005); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 147 (2005); Einer Elhauge, 
Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 272 (2003). 
64 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
65 Northeastern Telephone Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); Phillip 
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 716-18 (1975). 
66 Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342 (2005). 
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can be said to be a monopolist;67 (5) even a dominant firm has no obligation 
to cooperate with its competitor;68 (6) exclusive dealing is per se legal if 
more than 80% of the market remains open to competitors;69 (7) exclusive 
dealing cannot be illegal if the non-dominant party is free to terminate the 
contract on short notice;70 (8) a firm does not have market power in an after 
market if it lacks market power in the primary market;71 (9) bundled 
discounts are not unlawful unless an equally efficient competitor making 
only one product covered by the discount would have to price below its cost 
in order to compete;72 and (10) a firm can never be liable for 
monopolization based on the mere fact that it has designed its products in a 
way that harms competitors.73
For its part, the Supreme Court has not yet given a strong indication of 
any general predilection for rules or standards with respect to exclusionary 
practices.  In Kodak, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion made a nod 
toward standards:  “Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions 
rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. 
This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, 
focusing on the “particular facts disclosed by the record.’”74 As discussed 
below, a number of lower court judges have taken this admonition as a 
general preference for post-hoc determinations in exclusionary conduct 
cases.75 But it is not clear that a consistent majority of the Supreme Court’s 
 
67 Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 
1945) (opining that “it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent [market 
share] would be enough” to constitute a monopoly); and Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. 
Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969) (observing that a 50% market 
share is a “prerequisite for a finding of monopoly”); with Broadway Delivery Corp. 
v. United Parcel Service, 651 F.2d 122, 127-29 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a 50% 
market share is not a prerequisite for being a monopolist). 
68 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 
398 (2004); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 
n.32 (1985). 
69 ANTITRUST LAW, 1 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 222 (5th ed. 2002) 
(surveying cases and reporting that there thus exists a “virtual safe harbor . . . for 
market foreclosure of 20 percent or less”). 
70 United States v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2005). 
71 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
72 Ortho Diagnostic Sys. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996). 
73 C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369-72 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for per se 
immunity from antitrust liability for product design of patented goods). 
74 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992). 
75 See infra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx. 
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justices in the past two decades would prefer to shun rules in exclusionary 
conduct cases.  In two of its most recent decisions, the Court has seemingly 
applied rules corresponding to examples (1) and (5) above.76 On the other 
hand, it rejected rule (8) in favor of a more fact-specific approach.77 
Example (3) was once the rule but the Court recently heard argument on the 
issue and appears open to reconsidering it.78 The Court’s most recent 
exclusionary practices decision, involving discriminatory manufacturer 
rebates to dealers selling to different customers, formulated its holding in a 
fairly rule-like way, although it left open the possibility that the rule might 
not apply in extraordinary cases.79 But the Court has heard so few 
exclusionary conduct cases in the last few years that it is difficult to 
extrapolate a general direction. 
On the other hand, there is a definite trend in the lower courts in favor 
of standards over rules.  In many of the recent significant exclusionary 
practices cases, the lower courts have rejected categorical rules that would 
either have created or immunized against liability for exclusionary 
practices, even though there was often support for such rules in case law 
precedent or in the academic literature.  In Microsoft,80 the D.C. Circuit 
rejected the district court’s per se approach to the tying of Windows and 
Internet Explorer and remanded for consideration under a full rule of reason 
approach, but also rejected Microsoft’s argument that its product design 
decisions were “per se lawful.”  In Dentsply,81 the Third Circuit rejected 
 
76 See Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); 
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 
n.32 (1985). 
77 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
78 See Transcript of Oral Argument in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, 
Inc., No. No. 04-1329 2005 WL 3370426, 74 USLW 3350 (Nov. 29, 2005). 
79 Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 
2006 WL 43971 (Jan. 10, 2006) (holding that manufacturer ordinarily may not be 
held liable for secondary-line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act 
in the absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers 
competing to resell its product to the same retail customer). 
80 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (2001).  Microsoft deviates from 
earlier Supreme Court decisions that had seemed to impose a rule of per se 
illegality where the defendant has market power in the tying market.  E.g, Fortner 
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969). 
81 U.S. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2005).  The possibility 
of a “rule” in this area is shown by cases like Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser 
Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984), where the Seventh Circuit held 
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defendant’s argument that an exclusive dealing arrangement could not be 
exclusionary if the customer could terminate it at will. In Ticketmaster,82
the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument that an exclusive dealing 
contract of six years of duration was “inherently unreasonable.”  In 
LePage’s,83 the Third Circuit held that bundled discounts are not subject to 
bright-line cost/revenue comparison tests applicable in predatory pricing 
cases, but must be evaluated based on whether they have exclusionary 
effects.   In Spirit,84 the Sixth Circuit held that even in single product 
predation cases a dominant firm does not have an absolute defense if it 
priced above its cost.  In Conwood,85 the Sixth Circuit held that the facts 
that output was expanding, new products were being introduced, and the 
plaintiff’s market share increased during the period of the alleged 
monopolization did not categorically negate the possibility that the 
defendant was monopolizing.  Framing the governing law as a rule would 
have been possible in all of these cases, but the courts declined in 
preference for a standard-based approach. 
In these and a number of other recent exclusionary practices decisions, 
federal appellate courts have signaled that simple rules are insufficient to 
address the diverse and complex business practices governed by the 
antitrust laws addressed to exclusionary practices.  Rhetorical slogans 
expressing the impossibility of rule-based monopolization law are being 
repeated in the leading cases, linking together disparate exclusionary 
practices cases to form a common standard-oriented jurisprudence. Courts 
have taken Kodak admonition against “legal presumptions based on 
formalistic distinctions”86 as a mandate for adjudicatory flexibility and post 
hoc decision making.87 The D.C. Circuit’s proclamation that 
“[a]nticompetitive conduct’ can come in too many different forms, and is 
too dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have 
 
that exclusive dealing contracts “terminable in less than a year are presumptively 
lawful.” 
82 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com Inc., 127 Fed.Appx. 346 (9th Cir. 2005). 
83 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
84 Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 951-52 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
85 Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 788-91 (6th Cir. 2002). 
86 See supra at xxx. 
87 United States v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2005); Z-Tel 
Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 522 
(E.D. Tex. 2004); Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Appleton Papers, Inc., 35 
F.Supp.2d 1138 (D. Minn. 1999); USAirways Group, Inc. v. British Airways PLC, 
989 F.Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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enumerated all the varieties”88 is gaining popularity—and an aura of 
inevitability—through repetition.89 The implication is that since it is 
impossible to catalogue anticompetitive practices ex ante, the liability 
determinants governing exclusionary practices can never be decided until a 
particular practice is examined in context in litigation. Another popular 
maxim, derived from the Supreme Court’s Continental Ore decision, 
cautions courts to give plaintiffs “the full benefit of their proof without 
tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the 
slate clean after scrutiny of each.”90 Courts sometimes employ the 
Continental Ore maxim to justify rejecting rule-based holdings in 
exclusionary practices cases, reasoning that no single rule can exonerate the 
defendant since the legality of each practice depends upon its interaction 
with other practices.91 This approach lessens the possibility of a rule-bound 
approach to exclusionary practices cases by increasing the number of 
variables necessary to determine liability.   
To be sure, courts still adjudicate some exclusionary practices cases 
based on rules.  A prominent recent example includes the Department of 
Justice’s losing predatory pricing lawsuit against American Airlines that 
was dismissed on summary judgment because the government could not 
demonstrate that American priced below its cost.92 But the trend is clearly 
in the opposite direction.  As with collaborative practices, the lower courts, 
largely unchecked by the Supreme Court, have been moving exclusionary 
practices cases into open-ended, fact-specific adjudication. 
 
88 Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 
(D.C.Cir.1998). 
89 See Spirit, 431 F.3d at 951; LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 152; Conwood, 290 F.3d at 
784; Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 
513, 522 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
90 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 
(1962). 
91 See, e.g., Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 
1364 (3d Cir. 1992); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 383 F.Supp.2d 
686, 699 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications, 
Inc., 331 F.Supp.2d 513, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2004); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, II  
ANTITRUST LAW, § 310c, 147 (1996) ( “In a monopolization case conduct must 
always be analyzed ‘as a whole.’ A monopolist bent on preserving its dominant 
position is likely to engage in repeated and varied exclusionary practices. Each one 
viewed in isolation might be viewed as de minimis or an error in judgment, but the 
pattern gives increased plausibility to the claim.”). 
92 U.S. v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).  
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II.  THE POSSIBILITY OF (REAL) RULES 
Before proceeding much further, it is worth pausing to consider the 
possibility that a world of antitrust rules would be illusory because, in 
practice, rules always fade into standards.  Take H.L.A. Hart’s observation 
that “[n]atural languages like English are . . . irreducibly open-textured” 
when specifying “general classifying terms,”93 or Wittgenstein’s point that 
the problem with rules is that they do not tell you when they should be 
applied.94 Because language is irreducibly open-textured and indeterminate 
and because rules lack internal mechanisms to specify when they should be 
applied, even when the law is formally framed as a rule, it requires 
penumbral rules, canons of interpretation, and other secondary decisional 
criteria which end up swallowing the apparent simplicity of the rule.95 
Specifying the governing law as a simple, bright-line rule may merely 
conceal the fact that important balancing of social interests, weighing of 
probabilities, and choosing between competing ends and means lurk in the 
shadow of the rule.  Declaring a legal rule thus appears misleading or even 
dishonest because it hides the social preferences that animate the decision-
maker’s conclusion. 
Under one interpretation, antitrust law provides the perfect illustration 
for Hart and Wittgenstein’s point.  In this view, there never have been such 
things as case-determinative antitrust rules—only standards clad in rule-
bound rhetoric.  The current march toward standards, then, is not so much a 
change in liability determinants as a dissipation of the mystery surrounding 
antitrust’s concealed methodology. In a moment, I will dispute this 
possibility and argue that the specification of antitrust law as rule or 
standard has very important practical consequences.  But first, it is worth 
acknowledging the extent to which  Hart and Wittgenstein’s observation 
rings true in antitrust. 
A case in point is antitrust law’s long-standing per se prohibition 
against “price fixing.”  As any antitrust practitioner will recognize, price 
fixing appears in quotation marks because application of the per se rule 
depends not on the fact that competitors have literally fixed prices but that 
the challenged conduct falls within the antitrust category known as “price 
 
93 H.L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994) 
94 Ludwig Wittengenstein, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§143-252 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 1953); see Scott Hershovitz, Wittgenstein on Rules:  The 
Phantom Menace, 22 Oxford. J. Legal Stud. 619 (2002). 
95 Hart, supra n. xxx at 128; see also Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: 
Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 585, 599 (1994) (arguing that 
rules almost always become “impossibly cumbersome and complex”). 
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fixing.”  The judicial decision often thought to have established the per se 
rule against price-fixing did not involve price fixing either literally or 
figuratively but rather a gentleman’s agreement by dominant oil producers 
to buy up distressed oil from small refineries and thereby stabilize the 
wholesale market.96 The defendants never came close to agreeing on price.  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that any  “combination formed for the 
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or 
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce” 
amounts to “price fixing” in the relevant legal sense, whether or not the 
defendants have actually done the act that a lay person might suppose 
“price fixing” to be—fixing a price.97
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has described an act of literal 
price fixing by horizontal competitors—an agreement on prices for blanket 
licensing of musical repertoires—as something other than “price fixing” 
and hence subject to the rule of reason.98 In BMI v. CBS, the Supreme 
Court rejected textual “literalism” and held that application of the per se 
rule against price fixing is not as “simplistic” as “determining whether two 
or more potential competitors have literally ‘fixed’ a ‘price.’” Rather, “[a]s 
generally used in the antitrust field, ‘price fixing’ is a shorthand way of 
describing certain categories of business behavior to which the per se rule 
has been held applicable.”99 Application of the per se rule turns not on 
whether the conduct amounts literally to price fixing but on whether the 
“particular practice is one of those types or that it is ‘plainly 
anticompetitive’ and very likely without ‘redeeming virtue.’”100 This flex 
in the per se rule invites endless pages of briefing on whether the conduct at 
issue should be properly characterized as “price fixing” because it 
unjustifiably tampers with the market mechanism for determining prices or 
as something else because its can be justified by efficiencies, a very 
standardish way of doing law.101 Hence, Hart’s point that rules inevitably 
dissolve into standards and Wittgentsein’s point that rules do not tell us 
when to apply them. 
 
96 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
97 Id. at 223. 
98 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 
(1979). 
99 Id. at 9. 
100 Id. 
101 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason 
Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685 (1991); William H. Page, 
The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization Antitrust 
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1221, 1257-62 (1989). 
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But although rules may not be as neatly confined as they sometimes 
give the appearance of being, it would be wrong to suppose that the 
specification of antitrust law as either rule or standard has no practical 
consequences.  Indeed, it has many. First, when judicial decisions about 
certain forms of conduct takes on a rule-bound rhetorical form, it is not 
always possible to recharacterize the conduct to avoid application of the 
rule.  For example, given the strong efficiencies of the challenged conduct, 
one might have recharacterized Topco as involving a vertical rather 
horizontal restraint and thereby avoided application of the per se rule.102 
However, it was sufficiently obvious that the exclusivity system was a 
horizontal territorial allocation agreement that even its uncontested 
efficiencies were insufficient to save the arrangement.  Even in decisions 
since the Supreme Court’s “recharacterization” cases such as BMI and 
NCAA,103 conduct that paradigmatically fit the per se archetypes has not 
escaped per se condemnation.  In Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the Court 
condemned as per se unlawful what amounted to a strike by criminal 
defense lawyers.104 In Palmer, the court summarily reversed a court of 
appeals decision that a market division agreement between competing bar 
review courses should be analyzed under the rule of reason.  So while the 
indeterminacy of language may render a rule-based approach porous in 
borderline cases, it does not preclude fairly mechanical application of rules 
in paradigmatic cases. 
The specification of a liability determinant as either a rule or a standard 
may also critically affect the choice of who the ultimate legal decision-
maker will be:  jury, trial judge, or appellate court.  In U.S. legal culture, 
deference by players higher in the judicial hierarchy to players lower in the 
hierarchy depends in part on how the governing liability norm is framed. 
Trial judges are more likely to enter case-dispositive rulings on motions to 
 
102 Defendants unsuccessfully attempted this in U.S. v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 87 
S.Ct. 1847, 1850, 18 L.Ed.2d 1238 (1967), but the Court characterized the licensor-
licensee relationship as horizontal because the licensees owned substantially all of 
the licensor’s stock.  See also Abadir & Co. v. First Mississippi Corp., 651 F.2d 
422, 426-27 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that competitors are not allowed to turn an 
otherwise horizontal agreement into a vertical one by setting up a licensing 
corporation to impose market allocation agreements). 
103 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
104 Confusingly, the Court primarily analyzed the lawyers’ strike as a horizontal 
boycott, even though the case did not fit the per se boycott category articulated in 
recent cases.  See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & 
Printing Co. 472 U.S. 28 (1985) and FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 
U.S. 447 (1986). 
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dismiss or for summary judgment, a directed verdict, or judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict if the governing law is framed as a rule than if it 
is a standard.  Rule-oriented liability determinants allow the court to isolate 
a small number of dispositive facts in the record and hinge a dispositive 
order on the incontestability of those facts (or the absence of a proof on a 
critical fact):  i.e., the defendant did not price below average variable cost; 
the contract was terminable at will with ten days’ notice; the defendant’s 
market share was 30% indicating a lack of market power; the manufacturer 
and wholesaler agreed on a minimum resale price. 
Trial judges may be more reluctant to enter case-dispositive rulings 
where the governing law is framed as a standard.  Since liability or 
exculpation turns on multiple facts, which often must be weighed and 
balanced against one another, standard-based liability criteria are often said 
to create “issues of fact” that cannot be summarily decided on the 
sufficiency of the complaint or the undisputed facts in the record.105 If the 
trial judge does enter a dispositive order (usually, an order granting 
summary judgment for the defendant) after applying a liability standard, the 
appellate court should in principle review the matter de novo. In practice, 
however, appellate judges often quietly defer to trial court judgments based 
on multiple criteria rather than reinvestigate a complex and burdensome 
record.106 When liability determinants are framed as standards, trial judges 
 
105 For instance, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a restraint of trade is 
said to be a question of fact.  See California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 224 F.3d 942, 
958-59 (9th Cir. 2000); Winn Ave. Warehouse, Inc. v. Winchester Tobacco 
Warehouse Co., 341 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1965).   
106 In factually dense rule of reason cases, it is not unusual for the Circuit Court of 
Appeals to say something along the following lines, often in an unpublished 
opinion:  “After carefully considering each of these issues in light of the 
voluminous summary judgment record before the district court, we affirm for the 
reasons stated in the district court’s thorough Memorandum Opinion.”  Schueller v. 
Norman, 46 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir. 1995) (unpublished disposition).  Of course, 
sometimes cases involving conduct subject to the per se rule also present factually 
dense summary judgment records and also invite appellate deference to the district 
court’s summary judgment ruling.  E.g., Hall v. American Airlines, Inc., 118 
Fed.Appx. 680 (4th Cir. 2004).  However, questions of antitrust policy in per se 
cases (as supposed to questions of commission—did or did not the defendants 
agree?, for example) are usually treated as crystallized question of law inviting 
truly de novo appellate review.  See Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
363 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that district court’s determination that 
agreement was per se illegal would be reviewed de novo and citing Areeda-
Hovenkamp treatise for the proposition that although a court’s determination that 
the per se rule applies “might involve many fact questions, the selection of a mode 
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often will take this as a signal that they should be sparing in entering 
dispositive orders, but when they do enter dispositive orders after 
canvassing a complex record, they will often receive deference in the court 
of appeals.  If the appellate court does reverse, this usually means that 
ultimate decision-making is allocated to the jury.  Rarely will the court of 
appeals reinvestigate the entire record under a standard-based decisional 
criterion and reverse the decision of the jury.107 
So the specification of antitrust law as a rule or a standard does have 
practical importance in allocating decision-making.  In general, the more 
that a body of law expresses itself in rules as opposed to standards, the 
more frequently that appellate courts will be the ultimate decision-makers.  
The more that a body of law expresses itself in standards as opposed to 
rules, the more frequently both trial judges and reviewing courts will insist 
that the matter must be committed to the discretion of the jury in a jury trial,  
the district court in a bench trial, or the agency or administrative law judge 
in an administrative proceeding.108 Or, if the trial court does enter a 
dispositive ruling under a multi-factored decisional criterion, the appellate 
court will often defer to the dispositive rulings of the district court rather 
than reinvestigate the record.  Hence, the practical effect of rules is to push 
ultimate decision-making up the legal hierarchy and the effect of standards 
is to push ultimate decision-making down the legal hierarchy. 
A related point is that framing the governing liability determinant as a 
rule encourages trial courts to play a gate-keeping role to prevent weaker 
 
[of analysis] is entirely a question of law.”) (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1909b (1998)). 
107 One the rare cases where this occurred was Brooke Group, where the Supreme 
Court undertook sufficiency of the evidence review and reversed the jury’s primary 
line price discrimination liability verdict.  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).  Although primary line price 
discrimination is subject to a below-cost rule, the Supreme Court did not decide the 
case based on that rule but on the implausibility of the claim that Brown & 
Williamson could have recouped its costs of predation, a decidedly more standard-
like question. 
108 Technically, factual findings are never committed to the discretion of 
administrative law judges.  The FTC may review factual findings of its ALJs de 
novo and courts of appeal review factual findings of the FTC under the usually 
deferential substantial evidence standard.  Schering Plough Corp., Docket No. 
9297, slip op. at 8 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003);16 C.F.R. § 3.54(a); 15 U.S.C. § 45(c).  
However, where the FTC’s factual findings differ from those of the ALJ, the court 
of appeals gives less deference to the agency’s factual findings, Schering-Plough 
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1062-63  (2005), which gives the Commission some 
incentive to avoid overruling its ALJs on questions of fact. 
CRANE 3/5/2006 2:56 PM 
26
cases from reaching a jury.  The Supreme Court’s Matsushita109 decision 
encourages such gate-keeping by trial courts in complex antitrust cases.  In 
theory, Matsushita should create a gate-keeping culture in both antitrust 
cases governed by rules and those governed by standards, since trial courts 
are directed to inquire into the economic plausibility of the plaintiff’s 
claims before allowing them to go to a jury.110 In practice, however, courts 
have resisted using Matsushita to justify the grant of summary judgment or 
directed verdict in cases involving practices governed by the rule of reason 
or generalized monopolization standards.111 They  have been more apt to 
invoke their gate-keeping function in cases involving rules, whether 
prohibitory or exculpatory, such as the per se prohibition on price fixing112
and the below-cost pricing rule for predatory pricing.113 Some courts have 
explicitly distinguished between the use of the Matsushita “plausibility” 
screen in alleged conspiracy cases (bound by a per se rule) and tying cases 
like Kodak114 where, although a per se rule nominally applies, economic 
analysis rather than a priori legal categories is generally dispositive.115
Courts are more comfortable playing gatekeeper to the jury when a 
 
109 Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
110 Id. at xxx. 
111 See, e.g., Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499 
(4th Cir. 2002); Key Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 979 F.2d 806 
(11th Cir. 1992); Instructional Systems Development Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. 
Co., 817 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1987); but see Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, 
Inc., 850 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1988). 
112 See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004); 
InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2003); Blomkest 
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000); 
Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., 201 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 1999); 
but see Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 472-74 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that defendants’ alleged behavior would be per se illegal as group 
boycott if proven and denying summary judgment after conducting “Matsushita 
implausibility” analysis). 
113 See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191 (3d Cir. 
1995); Stearns Airport Equipment Co., Inc. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 
1999); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 
1988); U.S. v. AMR Corp., 140 F.Supp.2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001), aff’d, 335 F.3d 
1109 (10th Cir. 2003); C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 944 F.Supp. 
66 (D. Mass 1996); but see Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 63 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1995). 
114 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
115 Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., 201 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
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formalized rule rather than an amorphous standard supplies the liability 
determinant. 
Finally, rules signal a greater importance for lawyers and standards 
signal a greater role for economists in antitrust adjudication.  The rising 
influence of economists in the antitrust agencies coincided with, and 
probably influenced, the shift from rules to standards.116 While economists 
have some importance in cases governed by rules (for example, to explain 
whether a price was below cost or a pattern of parallel prices supports an 
inference of collusion), their testimony is more likely to be curtailed or 
excluded when the governing liability criteria are articulated as rules than 
as standards.  Rules are imperative—they can be “violated,” “broken,” 
“ignored,” and “disregarded.”  Standards are subjunctive—they ask a 
question that can be answered in any number of ways. In a case governed 
by a rule, an economist who disagrees with some premise in the rule is 
liable to find his testimony rejected by the court.117 In a case governed by a 
standard, the gate keeping function of the court will generally be limited to 
ensuring the scientific reliability of the economist’s presentation.118 It is 
hard to reject an economist’s testimony for being contrary to a standard 
when the standard is framed in terms like “reasonableness” and 
“exclusionary.” 
The choice between rules and standards matters in antitrust.  As an 
expression of legal culture, articulation of antitrust law as rule prejudges 
many outcomes, pushes ultimate decision-making up the legal hierarchy, 
encourages judges to play a stronger gate-keeping role, and widens the 
scope of allowable economic testimony and other evidence.  Even if it turns 
out that the “rules” governing these practices are as indeterminate and 
malleable as Hart and Wittgenstein’s comments on language would suggest, 
antitrust judges perform their legal-cultural roles differently when the 
 
116 See Marc Allen Eisner & Kenneth J. Meier, Presidential Control Versus 
Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust, 34 Am. J. Pol. 
Sci. 269, 282-84 (1990) (arguing that the changing antitrust policy of the 
Department of Justice in the 1980s was caused  by the hiring of more economists in 
the Antitrust Division). 
117 Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1322 (11th Cir. 
2003) (affirming exclusion of testimony of economist who failed to “differentiate 
between lawful, conscious parallelism and collusive price fixing”); Information 
Resources, Inc. v. The Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 359 F.Supp.2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (excluding economist’s testimony to the extent he could not show that 
defendant’s prices were below variable cost). 
118 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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liability determinant is framed as a rule than when it is framed as a 
standard. 
 
III. EFFICIENCY REASONS FOR CHOOSING RULES OR STANDARDS 
So far we have seen that antitrust is moving in the direction of flexible, 
post hoc standards and that this has significant consequences for antitrust 
adjudication.  Is this movement desirable?  The answer depends in part on 
what  normative goals one uses to  measure the success of competition 
policy.  If efficiency is the goal, as generally assumed today,119 the 
movement toward standards is not unambiguously positive.  The effects of 
such a transition are felt both within litigation in terms of the costs and 
accuracy of adjudication and within the realm of market behavior because 
of the varying incentive effects of rules and standards.  This section 
considers the different ways in which the choice between antitrust rules and 
standards affects the efficiency outcomes of the antitrust enterprise and 
concludes with some decisional principles to guide the choice.120 
A. Costs of Promulgating and Administering the Legal Command 
 
Louis Kaplow has formulated an economic model in which the choice 
between rules and standards turns on the costs of promulgating and 
administering the law and the incentive effects caused by the choice 
between the two.121 Kaplow observes that when a legal command will be 
applied frequently, costs are minimized by framing the command as a rule 
since there are economies of scale to figuring out the optimal content of law 
ex ante.122 Conversely, when the legal command will be applied 
infrequently, it may be less costly to wait and see whether a particular 
circumstance actually arises before deciding on the content of the legal 
command.123 The costs of the rules versus standards choice is also affected 
by the degree to which individuals subject to the command acquire legal 
advice ex ante.  In general, it is less costly for individuals to acquire 
knowledge about rules and therefore more likely that they will and the 
 
119 See infra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx. 
120 See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules:  On 
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984) (distinguishing 
between “decision rules” that govern governmental decision-making and “conduct 
rules” that govern the conduct of regulated actors). 
121 Kaplow, supra n. xxx. 
122 Id. at 577. 
123 Id. 
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acquisition of the knowledge about rules makes it more likely that 
individuals will conform their behavior to the law.124 
Antitrust law applies to a finite number of archetypes of industrial 
behavior:  vertical resale price maintenance; tying; merger; refusal to deal; 
below-cost pricing; exclusive dealing; joint venture; territorial allocation; 
patent pooling; and perhaps twenty or thirty more.  Business transactions 
occur within each of these categories with high frequency.  The financial 
stakes from running afoul of the law—felony convictions, treble damages, 
attorneys fees, stock price declines—are high compared to the (also not 
inexpensive) cost of legal advice.  Following Kaplow’s model, there are 
economies of scale to be achieved by ex ante promulgation of the relevant 
legal command as to these behavioral archetypes and a high likelihood that 
the subjects of the legal command will acquire knowledge about the legal 
command. 
One objection to antitrust rules governing industrial archetypes is that 
they could not possibly cover every category of potentially anticompetitive 
conduct.  Hence, the D.C. Circuit’s previously mentioned admonition that 
“[a]nticompetitive conduct’ can come in too many different forms, and is 
too dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have 
enumerated all the varieties”125 This maxim makes sense when understood 
as an admonition against attempting to catalogue in advance every possible 
permutation of antitrust conduct and specifying its liability determinants—
that would be excessively costly as to infrequently practiced forms of 
anticompetitive behavior.  But the maxim does not make sense as applied to 
archetypal industrial behavior that is frequently the subject of antitrust 
litigation.  In its recent Spirit decision, the Sixth Circuit invoked the 
Caribbean Broadcasting maxim to explain why Northwest Airlines could 
be liable for lowering its price on its Detroit-Philadelphia and Detroit-
Boston flights.126 According to the court, even if the lowering of the prices 
did not amount to predatory pricing, that fact should not be dispositive on 
liability since anticompetitive conduct can take forms other than predatory 
pricing.  But the alleged conduct at issue was archetypal predation—
lowering price to drive out a rival—which has been the subject of hundreds 
of predation cases which have yielded well-known predatory pricing 
liability rules.  It is no reason to avoid framing or applying liability rules as 
 
124 Id. at 577. 
125 Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 
(D.C.Cir.1998). 
126 See Spirit, 431 F.3d at 951. 
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to paradigmatic and frequent occurrences that it would be too costly to 
frame rules for non-paradigmatic and infrequent occurrences.127
There are difficulties in applying this cost-based preference for rules in 
paradigmatic cases.  Easterbrook rightly complains that the standard-based 
approach to antitrust creates high litigation costs,128 but also does not want 
to return to the per se rule, which he finds excessively interventionist.129
Rather, Easterbrook proposes a series of strong, but not quite rule-like, 
presumptions, such as the use of a market-power screen and  a requirement 
that plaintiff “demonstrate that the defendant’s practices are capable of 
enriching the defendant by harming consumers.”130 These presumptions, 
however, can be every bit as vague as the rule of reason.  How does one 
know whether a firm has market power without defining a relevant 
market?131 How does one know whether the defendant’s practices are 
capable of enriching defendant by harming consumers without analyzing 
the actual effects of the conduct on prices and output levels? 
So here lies a dilemma.  Per se rules of illegality are often vastly 
overbroad but an open-ended rule of reason approach would create 
excessive litigation costs and uncertainty.  Clear rules are necessary to 
provide optimal incentives to engage in beneficial competitive behavior and 
 
127 The Sixth Circuit seemed to believe that Northwest’s conduct was 
distinguishable from ordinary predation because Northwest had not only lowered 
its price but added capacity to absorb demand diverted from Spirit.  431 F.3d at 
951.  That distinction makes no sense.  Every predator will have to expand its 
capacity to absorb the business diverted from the prey and every predator facing a 
downward sloping demand curve will have to further expand its output to absorb 
new demand occasioned by the lower price.  Lowering price and adding capacity 
go hand in hand in virtually every predation case. 
128 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1984) 
“When everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive . . . .  Litigation costs are the 
product of vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination 
more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the rule of reason.”). 
129 Id. at 10. 
130 Id. at 17-18. 
131 Easterbrook is confident that the market definition question can often be 
answered without resort to a full market definition inquiry, which he rightly 
identifies as a “fool’s errand.”  Id. at 22.  He believes that  it is possible to 
“ascertain power directly” by using “either evidence of inability to raise price or 
evidence of price covariance between the defendant’s goods and the products of 
rivals.”  Id.  Easterbrook is right a court may be able to rule out the possibility that 
the defendant has market power without reaching a definitive conclusion as to what 
is the relevant market in some platonic sense, but the tools he describes to conduct 
the inquiry are the same sorts of fact-intensive, economically complex tools 
ordinarily used in market definition inquiries. 
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reduce litigation costs but relatively few forms of industrial behavior should 
be negatively sanctioned without a careful inquiry into their motivation and 
market effects.  As in most “rules versus standards” discussions, the debate 
quickly reaches a stalemate. 
The solution, though imperfect, is to use bright-line rules as 
immunizing devices for broad swaths of industrial behavior while 
preserving a role for standards in determining liability for conduct falling 
outside of the safe harbors created by the rules.  For many categories of 
conduct, such an approach minimizes the cost of configuring the law 
because the rule itself supplies a conclusive answer of no liability or 
presents a safe harbor that defendants can elect in order to minimize the 
likelihood of litigation.  For example, specifying that a firm cannot be held 
liable for tying unless it has at least a 50% market share in the tying market 
would provide a case-dispositive safe harbor that could reduce litigation 
costs substantially in a large number of tying cases, even though such costs 
would remain in cases where the defendant’s market share exceeded 50%.  
While it would also save costs to specify prohibitory rules for cases falling 
outside the safe harbor (such as making tying per se unlawful if the 
defendant’s tying product market share exceeds 50%), the generalization of 
such a rule would be vastly overbroad.  Bright-line rules are most 
appropriate in antitrust when used as immunizing devices.  Relatively few 
categories of conduct are unambiguously harmful and can be prohibited in 
equally categorical terms. 
Even as to the 50% market share immunizing rule, there remains the 
question whether such a rule would be penny wise but pound foolish by 
saving litigation costs while licensing firms to engage in socially costly 
tying behavior.  I consider that overinclusion question next. 
 
B. Underinclusion, Overinclusion, Adjudicative Error, and Incentive 
Effects 
 
There is an oddity in the timing of antitrust law’s progression from 
rules to standards.  This transition has taken place during the same time 
frame as antitrust law has settled on allocative efficiency as its primary, if 
not sole, objective.  In the currently dominant paradigm, antitrust law is 
supposed to deter firms from engaging in collusive or exclusionary conduct 
resulting in deadweight losses attendant to the output reductions that result 
from price increases.132 Antitrust today is primarily concerned with 
 
132 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE ¶ 1.3b at 19-20 (2d ed. 1999). 
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incentive effects and not with compensation or distributive justice.133 But, 
if that is true, the case for open-ended standards and post hoc adjudication 
seems prima facie weak.  One strong advantage of rules over standards is 
predictability, which matters most when one is trying to incentivize 
appropriate behavior. 
This last statement is subject to a caveat.  Predictability may be 
disadvantageous if the lawmaker is trying to limit behavior of dubious, but 
uncertain, social value.  Take sexual harassment.  A legal rule specifying 
every form of prohibited behavior would have the disadvantage of 
providing a roadmap for boors to avoid liability while continuing to be 
boors.  One could respond by adding further boorish behavior to the list of 
prohibitions, but sooner or later the rule-makers would begin to sense that 
adding further categories to the list would be overly cumbersome and dilute 
the seriousness of more offensive categories of behavior already on the list.  
By instead framing the liability determinant vaguely,134 the EEOC has 
discouraged a wide range of behavior that has low social value but might 
not be prohibited if all forms of misbehavior were catalogued in advance.  
So uncertainty about the legal determinant can have healthy deterrent 
effects. 
Antitrust is not that way.  It regulates business behavior that generally 
has high social value but is somewhat “tipsy”—at a certain point, the 
conduct tips suddenly from beneficial to harmful.  For example: lowering 
prices is highly socially valuable until suddenly they are so low that 
competitors are driven out of the market leading to long-term price 
increases;135 product innovation is highly socially valuable until the new 
design abruptly shuts out competitors from an after-market;136 cross-
 
133 On the trade-offs between total social welfare (i.e., efficiency) and consumer 
welfare, see Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The 
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 1, 4-5 
(1982); Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1020, 1032-33 (1987).  
On the predominance of total welfare concerns in antitrust today, see RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9-32 (2d ed. 2001).  For a contrary view, see Robert H. 
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The 
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65, 68-69 (1982). 
134 “Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature” that create “an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment.” 29 CFR § 1604.11(a). 
135 See Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx. 
136 See Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 
1121, 1142 (1983);  Kara E. Harchuck, Microsoft IV:  The Dangers to Innovation 
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licensing patented technology lowers production costs and improves quality 
until it becomes a mechanism for price-fixing;137 and information exchange 
between competitors lowers search costs and helps firms rationalize 
production decisions until it tips over and facilitates cartelization.138 
Antitrust is not a field in which unpredictability of litigation outcomes is 
beneficial because chilling broad categories of low-value behavior is 
desirable.  Most of the conduct adjacent to the harmful conduct is valuable. 
Predictability in antitrust is thus important, but it is not a sufficient 
reason to justify rules even for a system concerned primarily with incentive 
effects.  If the rules cannot be framed to correspond closely to socially 
optimal behavioral criteria, then the rules will provide predictability but not 
the right incentives.  Broad rules often fail to capture socially optimal 
outcomes.  The 55 mile-per-hour speed limit slows down some drivers who 
would be perfectly safe at 70 and speeds up  some drivers who are 
dangerous at any speed over 40. Rules tend toward over-and under-
inclusion, which dulls the advantage of their predictability.  The “rules 
versus standards” debate thus descends into the following kind of stalemate: 
Rules, more than standards, provide ex ante notice of the law’s command 
and therefore enable the law’s subjects to conform their behavior to its 
dictates.139 This is widely thought to be a virtue of rules, particularly if one 
is concerned about due process values or deterring undesirable behavior.140 
Posed by the Irresponsible Application of a Rule of Reason Analysis to Product 
Design Claims, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 395 (2002). 
137 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, 
and Standard Setting, in 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119 (Adam B. Jaffe 
et al. eds., 2001). 
138 See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (holding that 
an informal arrangement among corrugated container manufacturers to share bid 
information on specific customer contracts was sufficient to find an unlawful 
restraint of trade); Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-
12 (1921) (affirming the district court’s finding that a manufacturers’ association 
information-sharing plan was an unlawful restraint of trade that contributed to a 
significant decrease in production and increase in prices). 
139 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of 
the Forms:  A Reassessment of §2-207, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1217 (1982). 
140 Due process is particularly important when the sanction for violation is criminal 
punishment including lengthy incarceration.  It is thus not surprising that the 
current enforcement practice of the federal government is not to criminally 
prosecute any behavior other than hard-core cartels, which are subject to a sharply 
delineated per se rule.  See Department of Justice, Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and 
Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.htm (visited 1/21/06). 
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But standards are more likely than rules to locate the precise dividing line 
between desirable and undesirable behavior.  Rules are more likely than 
standards to be overinclusive or underinclusive.  Finally, promulgation of 
law as a standard is more likely than promulgation of law as a rule to result 
in adjudicatory error, since there are more variables to consider and the 
relationship between the variables is exponentially more complex. 
Let us examine these proposition more closely with a careful eye on the 
peculiarities of antitrust law.  If antitrust law is framed in a rule-like way, it 
is more likely that firms will be able to avoid some of the inefficient and 
consumer-harming behavior with which antitrust law is concerned because 
they will have clearer advance guidance.  But because the rules will 
necessarily be over- and under-inclusive,141 rent-seeking firms will find the 
loopholes and zones of underinclusion and exploit them to cause 
inefficiencies and harm to consumers.  At the same time, some “innocent” 
firms will either be penalized for engaging in conduct that is efficient and 
does not harm consumers or will simply forgo that conduct, finding less 
efficient and consumer-friendly ways of doing business.  At this level of 
generality, the argument between rules and standards still reaches a draw. 
The impasse can be broken by considering the remedial features of 
antitrust law.  In a civil case, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover 
automatically trebled damages.142 To the extent that the antitrust violation 
was difficult to detect, this multiplier may simply ensure that antitrust 
violations do not have a positive expected value.143 But apart from hard-
core price fixing or bid rigging cartels and similar conspiracies, the conduct 
giving rise to many antitrust violations is not difficult to detect since many 
violations arise from publicly perspicuous business practices.144 While it 
 
141 See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 
703, 710 (1991) (arguing that “rules are necessarily under- and over-inclusive with 
respect to the sets of reasons that support or ground them”); Schauer, supra n. xxx 
at 31-34 (describing rules as “entrenched generalizations likely to be under- and 
over-inclusive in particular cases). 
142 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
143 See generally Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 
J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).   
144 For example, the Visa and Mastercard bylaw requiring issuer banks not to issue 
other credit cards had been in place for years, and approved by an earlier court of 
appeals decision, before the Second Circuit disapproved it under the rule of reason 
in the Department of Justice action.  SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc. 
(Mountainwest), 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994).  With thousands of participating 
banks, it is inconceivable that the bylaw could have remained a secret.  See also 
Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx at xxx (discussing how 
2006]  Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication  35 
 
35
may be difficult for the court to determine whether to find the conduct a 
violation, such adjudicatory uncertainty is just as likely to result in a false 
positive as a false negative, so the ex ante incentive effects are a wash.145 
Even where there is only a one in three chance that the conduct will be 
detected, other costs of an adverse judgment deter the antitrust violation.  
Prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees from the 
defendant, but the defendant does not have a reciprocal right.146 This 
unilateral fee shifting comes on top of the costs that the defendant incurs to 
defend the suit, including not only hiring attorneys and economists but the 
time and effort of its executives called upon to aid in the defense of the 
case, produce documents, and testify in deposition or at trial.  And then 
there are reputational effects from an adverse judgment.  The filing of an 
antitrust lawsuit may cause a decline in the defendant’s stock price 
exceeding the net present value of the expected damages judgment and 
costs of defense (since shareholders may take the lawsuit as a signal of 
careless or incompetent managers).147 The intra-firm reputations, status, 
and compensation of individual managers may be at risk, causing them to 
be particularly careful to avoid actions that would bring about an adverse 
judgment to the firm.148 
Antitrust law is thus powerfully structured to deter violations.  Now 
consider the implications for underinclusion and overinclusion.  Say that 
there is a dividing line x that represents the exact point of demarcation 
between conduct that is socially desirable and undesirable.  The function of 
a standard is to locate x as closely as possible.  Ex ante, the subject of the 
standard—let us call her A—does not know exactly where x will fall, but 
makes her own estimate.  Having located her own estimate at y, she will 
only approach y to the point that the gains from her approach exceed the 
probability that she will unknowingly have crossed x, multiplied by the 
costs of having crossed x. Since the costs of crossing x are large, A will 
 
predatory pricing relies on reputation effects to be successful, and therefore is 
unlikely to be undetected). 
145 Except to the extent that the relevant subjects of the law are risk averse, in 
which case the difficulty in predicting how a court will decide will prevent some 
firms from engaging in the conduct. 
146 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
147 Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor 
Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. Fin. 557, 557-58, 577-79 (1987); 
Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?,
40 J. Fin. 793, 799 (1985). 
148 See MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL 
CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 144-45 (2000). 
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keep a safe distance from y. If A’s information about the location of x was 
relatively accurate, A will have forgone some socially desirable behavior to 
avoid coming close to x.
Framing the law as a rule gives A a better indication of how she is 
entitled to behave.  It does not completely solve the problem, because there 
is some residual uncertainty about how the rule will be enforced and some 
risk of adjudicatory error.  Let us assume that adjudicatory error is equally 
likely to be type one (false negative) as type two (false positive).  The cost 
of a type two error (treble damages, attorneys fees, reputation effects) are 
usually going to be greater to A than the benefits of a type one error 
(monopoly profits).149 So A will still back away somewhat from the 
dividing line specified by the rule. 
Because it must be formulated ex ante, without knowledge of all of the 
facts, and for a class of conduct rather than a particular case, the rule will 
tend to be overinclusive, underinclusive, or both.  But, because of the 
remedial structure of antitrust law, underinclusion may cost less than 
underinclusion would in other circumstances.  The uncertainty about 
application and the risk of adjudicatory error, multiplied by the heavy cost 
of an adverse judgment, will cause A to keep away from the line established 
by an underinclusive rule.  Suppose again that x marks the exact dividing 
line between socially desirable and undesirable behavior.  If the rule is 
framed to create liability at x + 1, subjects of the rule, deterred by expected 
costs that exceed expected gains from approaching the line and risk 
aversion, may come no closer than x.  Hence, the judge or legislator 
framing antitrust as a rule can afford to be deliberately underinclusive 
without creating suboptimal deterrence. 
One could argue that it is also possible to be underinclusive when 
framing standards.  In order to create optimal incentives given the remedial 
structure of antitrust law, the courts could signal loudly that they will be 
underinclusive when applying standards after the fact.150 But that is still a 
much less certain way to affect incentives than announcing an 
underinclusive rule.  Another solution is to raise the quantum of evidence 
necessary to find a violation (such as requiring clear and convincing 
 
149 See Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx at xxx. 
150 The Supreme Court has done this with predatory pricing law, announcing that it 
views predation claims with suspicion and that they are presumptively unlikely to 
succeed.  See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 
(1986); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
226 (1993). 
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evidence),151 but this will usually be a less successful strategy than 
announcing underinclusive rules since the margin of error in predicting 
outcomes will be larger.  The ex post nature of the liability determination 
that comes with standards weakens the ex ante incentive effects of trying to 
announce the standards in an underinclusive way.   
Things are somewhat different when it comes to public enforcement.  
Criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act must occur in the realm of rules, 
as it in fact does.152 The threat of criminal penalties coupled with 
unpredictable standards and risk aversion would create excessive deterrence 
and due process values would be violated by announcing criminal 
punishment for crimes that were determined after the fact based on complex 
economic analysis.  On the other hand, standards look more attractive than 
rules when the government is suing for injunctive relief directed at future 
conduct.153 The risk of overdeterring socially beneficial conduct becomes 
much smaller and value of avoiding over- or under-inclusion increases 
since the legal command will be applied to the future behavior of a specific 
person whose unique circumstances are known.154 The purpose of antitrust 
law is no longer to create optimal incentives but rather to engage in 
command-and-control directives with respect to future behavior.  Further, 
in injunctive actions by the government the party ultimately deciding the 
facts is likely to be either an administrative law judge or a federal district 
judge, which reduces the probability of adjudicatory error endemic when 
juries apply complex balancing tests.  Thus, given the remedial structure of 
U.S. antitrust laws, there is a strong case to be made for liability rules for 
private adjudication and liability standards for public adjudication where 
prospective relief is sought.155 
151 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 Geo. L.J. xxx 
(2006). 
152 See supra n. xxx. 
153 In principle, the same is true when a private plaintiff sues only for injunctive 
relief, although (with the occasional ex ante private challenge to a merger) that is a 
very rare occurrence in antitrust. 
154 See Kaplow, supra n. xxx at 606 (noting that “if extremely harmful activities are 
to be permanently enjoined . . . it is valuable to invest resources to make accurate 
determinations in adjudication even if the enhanced accuracy toes not affect ex ante 
behavior”). 
155 Private plaintiffs might try to take advantage of collateral estoppel principles to 
claim that a judgment in favor of the government conclusively determines the 
defendant’s liability in a subsequent private action for treble damages, thus 
reviving the overdeterrence concerns.  See, e.g., In re Microsoft Antitrust 
Litigation, 355 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that certain factual findings made 
by the district court in Department of Justice Microsoft litigation were binding on 
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C. Choice of Ultimate Decision-Maker 
 
In Kaplow’s model, the content of law is generally assumed to be the 
same whether the decision is made ex post (as a rule) or ex ante (as a 
standard).156 In antitrust, however, the denomination of law as rule or 
standard may affect the allocation of ultimate decision-making authority 
and, hence, the content of the law.  As discussed in Section II, the effect of 
announcing the law as a standard is generally to push ultimate decision-
making in individual cases down the legal hierarchy—in the direction of the 
trial court, administrative law judge, or the jury—and the effect of 
announcing the law as a standard is generally to push ultimate decision-
making up the legal hierarchy—in the direction of the court of appeals.157 
If the institutional actors lower in the legal hierarchy tend to have different 
levels of competence or systemic biases than those in the upper levels, the 
choice of legal form may affect the formulation and application of law.  
There is no reason to believe that court of appeals and district courts 
generally have different systemic biases, except in the limited sense that 
court of appeals judges may be screened more rigorously during their 
Senate confirmations and therefore tend slightly more toward the political 
 
Microsoft in subsequent private actions for damages).  However, this can be 
addressed doctrinally by providing that only findings of fact made in the 
governmental litigation would be binding on the defendant in the subsequent 
private case, since the law applied in the two cases would be different. 
156 Kaplow, supra n. xxx at 570.  Kaplow recognizes that this assumption is not 
always realistic.  Id. 
157 Congress may also specify the content of antirust law through legislation.  
Putting aside the treble damages remedy, which is decisively rule-like (as 
compared to open-ended punitive damages standards), most of the important 
concepts in the federal antitrust concepts are articulated as open-ended standards.  
The choice between adjudicatory standards is thus delegated to the courts through 
the medium of common law development.  Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law 
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 36- 46 (1985) (describing antitrust 
statutes as delegating to courts power to develop common law of antitrust); Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1705 (1986) 
(same) Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544 
(1983) (same).  This is not inevitable.  The Antitrust Modernization Commission is 
presently studying a vast array of substantive and procedural antitrust questions and 
could recommend to Congress the adoption of legislation creating legislative rules 
or various matters.  See Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, §§ 11051-60, 116 Stat. 1856.  The Commission’s website is 
http://www.amc.gov. 
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center than district court judges.158 There may be a wider competence gap, 
however, particularly on complex questions of industrial policy.  Court of 
appeals judges are somewhat more likely than district judges to be drawn 
from academia or policy-oriented political posts, whereas district judges are 
more likely to have gained their seat through service as a prosecutor, public 
defender, or litigator in a law firm.159 To the extent that formulation of law 
as rule tends to push ultimate decision-making up the legal hierarchy 
toward appellate judges, the formulation of complex industrial policy as 
rule may be desirable, although the effect may be small. 
The effect is considerably larger when it comes to the allocation of 
responsibilities to jurors.  First, there is some evidence that juries tend to be 
predisposed against dominant firms, particularly when the dominant firm 
has taken harsh (although not necessarily anticompetitive) action against a 
smaller rival.160 Judicial opinions often warn against the dangers of relying 
on “bad intent” evidence consisting of violent metaphors culled from 
internal business memoranda precisely because this is the sort of evidence 
that jurors tend to focus on in otherwise dull antitrust cases that they don’t 
understand.161 
Further, even if jurors have no systemic biases, they are less competent 
on average than judges to decide complex matters of microeconomics, 
 
158 Appellate court nominations are more likely than district court nominations to 
be politically contentious.  Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush Remaking the 
Judiciary: Like Father Like Son?, 86 Judicature 282, 302 (2003).  One result of the 
increasing politicization of the judicial nomination process has been to produce a 
politically centrist circuit court judges.  Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 
2004 Forward:  A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 71 (2004). 
159 See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT 
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997).  Of course, both trial 
judges and court of appeals judges tend often acquire their posts through political 
patronage, but patronage is often dispensed along the lines discussed. 
160 See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 
xxx, xxx (2005); Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New 
Media and Deviancy, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 51, 52-59 (1995); but see VALERIE P. 
HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
(2000) (questioning claim that juries tend to be biased against big businesses). 
161 Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir. 1995); 
A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 
1990);  Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883 
F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Posner, supra n. xxx at 
215 (“Especially misleading is the inveterate tendency of sales executives to brag 
to their superiors about their competitive prowess, often using metaphors of 
coercion that are compelling evidence of predatory intent to the naïve”). 
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regulatory policy, and industrial organization. This is not to say that jurors 
are never competent in antitrust cases.  In this regard, it may be useful to 
distinguish between two kinds of factual determinations that juries are 
called upon to make:  personal facts and economic facts. Personal facts 
concern the motivations and conduct of the people who made the relevant 
business decisions, for example the truthfulness of witnesses, whether the 
relevant people took certain actions such as attending meetings, discussing 
certain topics, or placing telephone calls, whether they had knowledge of 
specified information as of a certain date, and whether they intended to 
bring about certain effects.  Economic facts concern the efficiency and 
economic effects of conduct, for example whether a particular free-riding 
concern is justified, whether a particular practice could exclude an equally 
efficient competitor, whether the defendant has market power, and whether 
specified conduct was more likely to contract or expand output.  Personal 
facts require no great business sophistication and are likely to be within the 
ken of an ordinary juror.  Economic facts often involve contested economic 
theories and are far outside the educational, experiential, and intellectual 
range of the ordinary juror. 
Cases governed by rules are more likely than those governed by 
standards to be resolved by reference to personal facts.  For example, price 
fixing cases—bound by a per se rule—turn on whether the defendants 
agreed on price, a matter that does not necessarily involve complex 
economic theory.  Although the jurors may still be exposed to conflicting 
economic testimony propounded to explain how parallel prices could (or 
could not have) emerged absent (or with) an agreement, the economic 
testimony will usually be merely corroborative of more direct evidence, 
such as fact witness testimony, diaries, phone logs, itineraries, and 
correspondence.162 Such cases raise fairly ordinary questions about human 
nature and conduct not unlike other kinds of criminal conspiracy cases.  On 
the other hand, an open-ended monopolization jury instruction like that 
given in LePage’s—did the defendant exclude the plaintiff on some basis 
other than efficiency?163—makes liability turn on economic facts which the 
average juror is ill-equipped to address.  Suppose that the defendant has 
used a particular practice as a means of price discrimination.  Asking the 
 
162 Where direct evidence of a conspiracy is lacking, circumstantial evidence 
tending to exclude the possibility of independent action may be sufficient to 
establish the existence of a conspiracy.  Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 
208 (1939); Theater Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 
537 (1954).   
163LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 167. 
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jury to decide whether this particular form of price discrimination is likely 
to increase or decrease output—whether it is efficient or inefficient—is 
unlikely to yield a very reliable answer when this very matter is highly 
contested among antitrust experts.164 
Antitrust rules sometimes turn on economic facts also,165 but standards 
almost inevitably do so.  This suggests that framing antitrust law as a 
standard for cases in which each party has the right to demand a jury trial is 
problematic.  Not only will the jury be called upon to decide economic facts 
outside its competence, but the designation of the law as a standard may 
influence the trial judge and court of appeals to afford a greater degree of 
deference to the jury’s (often confused) determination.  Rules have the 
virtue of presenting decisions to jurors in a way that tends to involve 
personal facts.  Rules also suggest a stronger gate-keeping and sufficiency 
of the evidence reviewing role for judges, which minimizes the costs of 
adjudicative errors by jurors.   
When it comes to public civil enforcement, framing the law as a 
standard is more desirable because it signals that greater deference will be 
given to the judgments of experts within the antitrust enforcement agencies, 
such as administrative law judges and the Commissioners of the Federal 
Trade Commission, and to the testimony of economists.166 Privileging the 
testimony of economists is problematic in cases likely to be decided by a 
jury, since it means deferring to the jury’s uninformed choice between 
competing experts.  Unfettering economic testimony from strict liability 
rules is more desirable in cases decided by antitrust specialists as fact-
finders or even in bench trials before federal district judges.  The risk of 
adjudicatory error  diminishes, and the advantage of seeking the exact 
dividing line between socially beneficial and harmful behavior increases. 
 
164 To get a flavor of the debate, see Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, 
Inc., No. 04-1329 (S. Ct.), 2005 WL 2427646 Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff, 
Ian Ayres, and Lawrence Sullivan as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (Sep. 
28, 2005); 2005 WL 2427642 Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondent (Sep. 28, 2005). 
165 In Brooke Group, for example, the jury was called upon to apply the average 
variable cost test—a rule.  Post-verdict interviews revealed that the jurors found 
Brown & Williamson liable for predatory pricing even though the jurors did not 
understand the relevant rule.  Austin, supra n. xxx at 53-60. 
166 In his classic work on administrative discretion, Kenneth Culp Davis argues that 
a major function of the FTC should be to frame rules.  See Davis, supra n. xxx at 
70-74.  But there is only a limited advantage to the FTC framing antitrust that will 
only apply to FTC actions, since there is no private right of action under the FTC 
Act.   Rules are most needed to govern private damages actions, not injunctive 
actions by the FTC. 
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D. Strategic Manipulation and Public Choice Considerations 
 
Antitrust law is susceptible to strategic misuse in two ways.  First, 
antitrust decision-makers may be subject to capture by regulated 
constituencies or others interested in influencing the content of antitrust law 
for personal advantage.167 Second, even if the content of antitrust law is 
correctly specified from a social welfare perspective, there is a danger that  
regulated parties will use antitrust litigation (or the threat of it) to achieve 
anticompetitive goals.168 The choice to promulgate law as either rule or 
standard can sometimes affect the likelihood that antitrust law will be 
strategically misused in either of these ways. 
First, consider the likelihood that the creation of antitrust norms will be 
unduly influenced—or “captured”—by special interests.169 Most antitrust 
law is created by the courts through a common law approach,170 not by 
Congress through statutes or the antitrust agencies through promulgation of 
administrative regulations.171 The constitutional structure of the federal 
judiciary—life tenure, irreduceable salary—is designed to create 
independence and objectivity, but there are still opportunities for judicial 
capture.172 Amicus curiae briefs by special interests can exert  considerable 
 
167 See THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE 
PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995); William 
J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition , 28 J. L. 
& Econ. 247 (1985). 
168 See Edward A. Synder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuses of the Antitrust Laws:  
The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 551 (1991); Crane, The Paradox of 
Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx; R. Preston McAfee & Nicholas V. Vakkur, The 
Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws, Working Paper, on file with author (2004). 
169 Antitrust law creation could also by the subject of another kind of public choice 
distortion—cycling or randomness—which may occur when numerous legislators 
consider multiple options.  See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND 
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).  My focus here is on the specification of antitrust law 
by the courts, which entails a much smaller number of decision-makers and smaller 
range of decisional options. 
170 See supra n. xxx. 
171 The agencies do promulgate guidelines concerning their enforcement intentions 
which can strongly influence business behavior.  This is particularly true in merger 
cases where, due to the importance of closing a deal quickly, opposition from the 
Federal Trade Commission or Department of Justice can mean the death of a deal 
whether or not a court would ultimately agree with the agencies’ position. 
172 See generally, Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 Hastings 
L.J. 355 (1999); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More 
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 66-87 (1991); Lee Epstein, Courts 
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influence on a court’s decision.173 Affected constituencies frequently 
attempt to shape antitrust decisions through a barrage of amicus curiae 
briefs joined by leading corporate sectors (i.e., pharmaceutical companies, 
manufacturers, retailers, franchisees), business associations, consumer 
groups, or the States.  Intellectual or attitudinal capture can also occur.  The 
Chicago School’s models hypothesizing the efficiency of  previously 
suspect business practices (such as vertical restraints, tying, price 
discrimination, and predatory pricing) may have “captured” the Supreme 
Court during the 1970s and 80s, largely because the Chicago School faced 
weak intellectual competition.174 This is not “capture” in the usual sense—
Chicago School scholars were not trying to influence the Court’s direction 
for personal advantage—but judicial outcomes can become distorted if 
judges begin to rely too heavily on any single intellectual current just 
because it consistently “wins” the argument against weaker theoretic rivals. 
Rules, more than standards, invite collaborative efforts by special 
interests to influence the outcome of judicial decisions.  When the Supreme 
Court or Court of Appeals frames antitrust law as a standard, it leaves most 
decisions about that particular business practice to case-by-case, post hoc 
determination.  Industry sectors, labor groups, consumer advocates, or other 
special interests have less to gain from seeking to influence any single 
litigated case involving a standard, since the next case involving the same 
constituencies may be decided differently when all of the relevant factors 
are weighed.175 Framing the law as a standard also lessens the chance for 
“capture” by any single intellectual school of thought, since the law will be 
made in the interstices of litigated cases rather than as a broad conceptual 
construct.  By contrast, special interests have more to gain from 
 
and Interest Groups, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 335, 
349 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991). 
173Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court:  Examining the Influence of Amicus 
Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 Law & Soc'y Rev. 807 
(2004);  Joseph D. Kearny & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743 (2000) (reporting that amicus 
curiae briefs have an impact on Supreme Court decisions). 
174 Michael A. Carrier, Antitrust After the Interception: Of a Heroic Returner and 
Myriad Paths, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 287, 291 (2002) (book review).  The “Post-
Chicago” school has not exerted as strong an influence on the courts, in part 
because it continues to face strong intellectual resistance from the Chicago School. 
Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic 
Approach, 69 Antitrust L.J. 469, 470 (2001).  
175 Framing the law as a standard also minimizes the number of cases on which the 
Supreme Court grants certiorari, since it is harder to create circuit splits out of 
adjudications under open-ended standards. 
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participating when the courts’ resolution will involve framing a rule, since 
that rule may predetermine many more future outcomes for those 
constituencies.  Framing antitrust law as a rule concentrates the stakes for 
larger swaths of interests and therefore invites special interests to undertake 
concentrated efforts to shape the rule.   
These considerations militate in favor of antitrust standards rather than 
rules, but the case is different when one considers the strategic 
manipulations that can occur in litigation itself.  Antitrust law is most 
subject to strategic misuse by rent-seeking competitors when it is framed as 
an amorphous standard.  A growing literature shows that firms can 
strategically misuse antitrust to coerce or induce their competitors to forgo 
engaging in practice that are efficient but disadvantage the plaintiff.176 For 
example, a less efficient firm might threaten a predatory pricing lawsuit 
against a more efficient firm to discourage price-cutting, a single-product 
firm might threaten a tying lawsuit against a diversified firm to discourage 
bundling, a technologically outdated firm might threaten a monopolization 
lawsuit against an innovative rival to discourage design innovation, or a 
firm making an inferior product might threaten a monopolization lawsuit to 
prevent its rival from making disparaging remarks.  Such rent-seeking 
behavior is more likely to be successful when the governing law is 
presented as a standard than as a rule because a standard creates more 
adjudicatory uncertainty and risk-averse defendants may desist from an 
efficient practice even if it is likely to be vindicated through litigation.  
Further, adjudication under a standard tends to prolong litigation and 
increase its costs, which increases the chances that the litigation can be used 
as a cover to organize tacit collusion between the parties.177 
So, again, rules and standards reach a conceptual impasse.  Standards 
are preferable because they are less likely to cause judicial capture at a 
macro level but rules are preferable because they are less likely to 
encourage rent-seeking litigation or litigation threats at a micro level.  
Neither one of these tendencies is probably strong enough to warrant a 
general preference for rules or standards, but some guiding principles can 
be drawn. The strategic misuse of antitrust law by competitor plaintiffs is 
most likely to be a concern in exclusionary practices cases.  Competitors 
typically do not have standing to assert antitrust claims in cases involving 
collusive but non-exclusionary conduct since the plaintiff usually benefits 
 
176 See supra n. xxx. 
177 See Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx at xxx. 
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from such conduct.178 In exclusionary conduct cases, rules are particularly 
desirable because they provide rent-seeking competitors with less 
opportunity to manipulate the remedial structure of U.S. antitrust law to 
achieve anticompetitive gains.  Where strategic manipulation is less a 
concern, framing antitrust law a standard may lessen the likelihood that the 
content of the law will be distorted through interest group pressures. 
 
E.  Synthesis of Efficiency Considerations and Decisional Principles 
 
The rules versus standards debate often ends in a stalemate because 
there are so many potential variables and it is difficult to know how to 
weight them.179 When a court breaks the impasse and chooses a rule or a 
standard (or a legal norm that is more rule-like or standard-like), it usually 
must do so based on an informed, but imprecise, judgment—what an earlier 
generation would have called “wisdom”—about which approach is the 
lesser of two evils.180 Both rules and standards have costs.  Weighting the 
various costs of rules and standards in antitrust is difficult.  Perhaps the 
most prudent course is to articulate the paradigmatic instances where rules 
or standards are preferable and leave the middle grounds ungeneralized.   
Rules have the greatest advantage when governing classes of lawsuits 
likely to be decided by juries and to result in overdeterrence due to the 
uncertainty of standards or strategic abuse in litigation.  Especially 
troubling is the trend in the lower courts to leave private exclusionary 
conduct cases to post hoc, fact-specific determination.181 This commits 
ultimate decision-making about economic facts to ill-equipped juries, 
threatens to chill vigorous competitive behavior, invites strategic 
manipulation by rent-seeking competitors, and increases the costs of 
antitrust litigation.  Antitrust law can afford to frame underinclusive rules 
governing exclusionary behavior in private cases because the high 
 
178 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 337 (1990) (holding 
that competitor lacked antitrust injury and therefore could not challenge vertical 
minimum price-fixing scheme since such a scheme would have worked to the 
competitor’s advantage) 
179 See Diver, supra n. xxx at 70-71, 107 (discussing the difficulties of aggregating 
tradeoffs between rules and standards into “an overall evaluation” and noting that 
“[c]ourts, as much as politicians, must throw competing values on the scales and 
somehow total the score”). 
180 Colin Diver refers to this as “an irreducible core of legal controversy about rule 
precision that yields only to an indwelling jurisprudential principle of fairness and 
propriety.”  Diver, supra n. xxx at 107. 
181 See supra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx. 
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likelihood of detection of such behavior combined with the substantial costs 
of an adverse judgment will deter most dominant firms from straying too 
close to the line drawn by the rule.  The same concerns hold, although to a 
lesser degree, in private collaborative conduct cases where only consumers 
are likely to have standing.  The risk of chilling efficient conduct remains, 
although the risk of strategic misuse diminishes. 
Rules are especially appropriate when used as immunizing devices for 
commercial behavior with ambiguous but usually positive social welfare 
consequences that could otherwise be challenged under the rule of reason.  
The antitrust agencies have encouraged the use of such safe-harbors for 
public litigation, for example in announcing that they usually will not 
challenge intellectual property licensing agreements where the licensor and 
licensee account for less than twenty percent of the relevant market.182 
Other potential safe-harbors include market share thresholds for tying, 
exclusive dealing, monopolization, and vertical restraints claims, an 
absolute “above cost” defense for predatory pricing, primary line price 
discrimination, and bundled discounting claims, and per se legality for new 
product design.  Conduct falling outside these or other safe-harbors would 
then be subject to rule of reason treatment.  
Few categories of business behavior warrant per se prohibition in rule-
like form—perhaps price fixing, bid rigging, patent fraud, and a few others.  
But rules can also be used to predetermine individual issues in litigation.  
For example, a conclusive presumption that a patent about which a patentee 
has brought an infringement lawsuit confers market power may be useful in 
simplifying tying litigation,183 even though it does not by itself resolve 
whether liability should be imposed.  Even where courts believe that 
ultimate liability issues should be left to rule of reason balancing, crafting 
rules to govern individual issues may reduce the costs of litigation, increase 
predictability, and minimize the risk of adjudicatory error and arbitrariness. 
Standards are paradigmatically most appropriate to govern public 
enforcement seeking prospective relief.184 Such cases pose the least risk of 
 
182 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property § 4.3 (1995), http:// www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf. 
183 See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., No. 04-1329 (S. Ct.), 
2005 WL 2427642 Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent (Sep. 28, 2005). 
184 The distinction I make between public and private enforcement is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s view that the Federal Trade Commission has 
prophylactic authority to create antitrust norms beyond those that would obtain 
under the Sherman Act.  See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966); 
F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-395 (1953). 
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overdeterrence and strategic misuse of antitrust and maximize the benefit of 
detailed, case-specific review.  To the extent that such cases are heard by 
specialized administrative law judges in the Federal Trade Commission, 
they also lower the cost of promulgating the applicable legal command, 
since the judges can apply at low cost experience from prior cases.  
Standards minimize the likelihood of special interest capture of the 
enforcement agencies by pushing decision-making down the legal and 
administrative hierarchy. 
To capture these considerations in a more concrete way, it may be 
useful to imagine a set of binary conceptual pairings where one value in 
each paring correlates more positively with rules and the other with 
standards, as shown in Table A.   
 
Table A 
 
Standard Rule 
Public litigation Private litigation 
Prohibitory determinant Immunizing determinant 
Injunction Damages 
Idiosyncratic conduct Archetypal conduct 
Collusive conduct Exclusionary conduct 
In choosing between rules and standards in antitrust, a court should be 
guided by the extent to which these various factors line up or juxtapose in 
that particular case.  Not all of the factors are of equal weight,185 but at a 
minimum they are useful in identifying the paradigmatic cases for applying 
rules or standards.  Thus, for example, a competitor action seeking damages 
for predatory pricing, which is a frequently litigated practice, should be 
subjected to immunizing determinants in the form of a rule since this case 
lines up all five rule factors (private, immunizing, damages, exclusionary, 
archetypal).186 Conversely, in a government action seeking an injunction 
against future participation in a potentially collusive agreement of a kind 
 
185 For example, the distinction between collusive and exclusionary conduct is 
predicated on the concern that competitors will exploit the indeterminacy of 
standards for anticompetitive advantage.  In a case brought by the government, this 
is unlikely to be a concern.  Thus, this conceptual pairing is only relevant in private 
actions. 
186 This roughly corresponds with the justification for the rule of per se legality for 
prices above marginal cost.  Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing 
and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 
709-10 (1975). 
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not often observed, it would be appropriate to create liability under a 
standard-based approach since that case would line up all five standard 
factors (public, prohibitory, injunctive, collusive, idiosyncratic).187 In cases 
where some factors point to standards and others to rules, the court would 
need to identify which of the factors was most relevant to its particular case 
and assign weight to the different factors based on the circumstances. 
 
IV. NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS 
Antitrust may be primarily concerned with economic efficiency, but the 
rules versus standards debate comprehends other values and concerns as 
well.  This final section considers the extent to which reasons other than 
efficiency might affect the choice between rules and standards in the 
antitrust domain.  In particular, it considers the role of both moral and 
expressive concerns and concludes that both have some limited importance 
to antitrust jurisprudence. 
A. Distributive Justice, Personal Autonomy, and Equal Treatment 
A significant part the rules versus standards debate has an ideologically 
charged flavor.  Libertarians like Friedrich Hayek and Richard Epstein have 
advocated a rule-based approach to law, believing that ex ante specification 
of bright-line liability criteria will minimize the aggrandizement of 
governmental authority.188 Conversely, critical legal studies adherents like 
Duncan Kennedy and Morton Horwitz have attacked the structure of rules 
as entrenching the inequitable status quo and allowing manipulation by the 
wealthy and privileged.189 
These arguments seem largely off the mark when it comes to antitrust.  
While the choice of particular antitrust rules or standards, or the mixture of 
the two, may have important implications for the distribution of wealth or 
 
187 This may describe the Polygram case.  See supra text accompanying notes xxx-
xxx. 
188 See Epstein, supra n. xxx; FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 
(1944) (advocating approach whereby “government in all its actions is bound by 
rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee 
with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge”); see also FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, 205-14 
(1960). 
189 See Kennedy, supra n. xxx at 1737-51, 1753-56; Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of 
Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977). 
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the degree of governmental interference with consensual market 
transactions, it seems difficult to predict ex ante whether a generally rule-
based or standard-based approach will be more interventionist when it 
comes to competition policy.  The earliest antitrust decisions pitted  
interventionist rules against permissive standards.190 When conservative 
federal judges used the antitrust laws to suppress the labor movement, 
Congress responded with legislative rules categorically immunizing strikes 
from the Sherman Act.191 Antitrust opposition to mergers,192 collaborative 
restraints of trade, and exclusionary practices reached its zenith under the 
Warren Court’s rule-based approach which restricted concentrations of 
industrial power and favored non-economic values and small business 
interests.193 The movement toward standards was at least in part the work 
 
190 Compare Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S., at 231 (1918) (per 
se rule of illegality and United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 
290 (1897) (rule of reason applied in favor of defendants).  In fairness, Chicago 
Board of Trade could be considered “progressive” insofar as it permitted a practice 
that allowed smaller, probably less efficient, rural dealers to participate in the 
market.  See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 44-45 (1978). 
191 Congress initially responded to use of antitrust law to enjoin strikes by 
providing in the Clayton Act that “[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity 
or article of commerce” and that labor organizations are not to be “construed to be 
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws” 
and by prohibiting federal courts to enjoin strikes. 15 U.S.C. § 17; 29 U.S.C. § 52.   
After the Supreme Court continued to sanction injunctions against labor picketing, 
see Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 330 (1921); Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City 
Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 202-03 (1921); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. 
Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 464 (1921), Congress responded with the Norris LaGuardia 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, categorically prohibiting federal injunctions against 
peaceful labor activities. 
192 In a succession of opinions, the Warren Court rejected merger after merger, 
creating the impression that it was following a rule of per se illegality for mergers 
causing an increase in market concentration.  See Arthur Austin, Antitrust Reaction 
to the Merger Wave: The Revolution vs. the Counterrevolution, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 
931, 948 (1988) (describing (“Warren Court merger decisions [as] virtual per se 
holdings.”). 
193 A classic statement of the Warren Court’s small-business preference appears in 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[W]e cannot fail to 
recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of 
viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional 
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries 
and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of 
decentralization.”).  For a generally positive account of the Warren Court’s 
approach to antitrust, see Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 
Cal. L. Rev. 917, 919, 922-23 (1987). 
CRANE 3/5/2006 2:56 PM 
50
of the Chicago School’s laissez-faire project in the 1970s and 1980s.  While 
some of the recent exclusionary practices cases have rejected rules that 
would have immunized defendants in favor of open-ended standards more 
likely to result in a plaintiff’s verdict, the history of antitrust jurisprudence 
generally suggests the opposite tendency than that suggested by Duncan 
and Horwitz:  rules have often been more favorable to antitrust 
interventions in market conduct and standards more favorable to business 
interests.194 
It is also hard to make the case that rules systematically favor powerful 
industrial interests that understand the rules and their loopholes and best 
know how to, and can afford to, manipulate the system.  Antitrust law is 
often enforced publicly by expert, motivated, and relatively well-financed 
staff at the Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission.  Even on 
the private side, the treble damages remedy,195 unilateral fee-shifting in 
favor of plaintiffs,196 and the magnitude of recoverable damages (often in 
the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars) has created a 
competent, motivated, and well-financed plaintiffs’ bar.  In cases of 
exclusionary conduct, the injured party is liable to be a corporation and not 
a poorly educated individual.  Even where the harm is distributed across a 
wide number of consumers, the class action mechanism—which is often 
favored in antitrust cases involving uniform conduct by the defendants 
affecting prices to a large number of consumers197—allows aggregation of 
claims in a way that levels the playing field. 
Of course, it is possible to view the entire antitrust project as a farce 
designed to conceal the deep inequities of capitalism.198 But if that is the 
 
194 This is not to say that, going forward, there is any particular reason to believe 
that rules will be applied in a more interventionist way than standards. 
195 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
196 Id.
197 Federal judges are fond of reporting that class certification is favored in antitrust 
cases.  See, e.g., In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, 232 F.R.D. 346, 350 
(N.D. Cal. 2005); Daniel v. American Bd. of Emergency Medicine, 269 F.Supp.2d 
159, 188 (W.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Industrial Diamonds Antitrust Litigation, 167 
F.R.D. 374, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
198 See, e.g., William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law 1887-
1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 221 (1955) (reporting that some observers 
maintained that Sherman Act was a fraud because Congress was dominated by 
“many of the . . . industrial magnates most vulnerable to real antitrust legislation”) 
(quoting M. FAINSOD & L. GORDON, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 
450 (1941)).  Senator Sherman, the Act’s sponsor,  admonished that Congress 
“must heed [the public’s] appeal or be ready for the socialist, the communist, and 
the nihilist,” 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890), suggesting that the goal of the Sherman 
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case, the choice between rules and standards does not matter much and the 
conversation needs to be about deeper questions of resource allocation, 
property ownership, labor rights, industrial policy, and law as a means of 
social control.  Antitrust—whether based on rules or standards—assumes 
the normativity of free enterprise, industrial competition, and demand-based 
allocation of social resources.  Within those parameters, rules are not 
generally more oppressive to the disadvantaged than standards. 
On the other side of the aisle, libertarian Richard Epstein advocates 
“simple rules for a complex world” in order to curb the power of the 
state.199 When it comes to antitrust, Epstein envisions a set of narrow 
rules—perhaps a common-law refusal to enforce price-fixing agreements 
and little more.200 Epstein envisions not simpler antitrust but virtually no 
antitrust. The argument for minimalist antitrust policy does not have that 
much to do with whether antitrust policy should be formulated as rules or 
standards if it is broadly formulated.    As we have seen, in the antitrust 
realm it is possible for rules to be either interventionist or laissez-faire 
(compare the Colgate and Dr. Miles rules).201 If antitrust law is going to 
address business practices like vertical restraints of trade, predatory pricing, 
or horizontal collusion, it is not clear ex ante that rules will be less 
interventionist than standards. 
Eric Posner argues that rules are to be favored “if we care about 
autonomy, because standards, more than rules, encourage self-reinforced 
conformity to the imagined goals of the state rather than actions that reflect 
one’s authentic values and interests.”202 It is not clear to what extent this 
argument has force as applied to antitrust law, which generally applies to 
large corporate actors rather than individuals.  The “authentic values and 
interests” of corporations are generally profit maximization for the benefit 
of shareholders,203 and it is hard to state categorically ex ante whether rules 
or standards are more likely to maximize shareholder profits. 
 
Act was to appease the public rather than to achieve significant wealth 
redistribution. 
199 Epstein, supra n. xxx. 
200 Id. at 123-27; see also Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level 
Playing Field:  The New Antitrust Paradox, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 49 (2005). 
201 See supra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx. 
202 Eric Posner, supra n. xxx at 117. 
203 Indeed, managers and boards of directors are ordinarily assumed to have a 
fiduciary obligation to pursue these goals single-mindedly.  But see Einer Elhauge, 
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733 (2005) 
(arguing that corporate law gives managers the discretion to sacrifice shareholder 
profits in favor of the public interest). 
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Another political-moral concern that often arises in the rules versus 
standards debate concerns equality.  Rules tend to create formal equality by 
eliminating arbitrariness and inconsistency in adjudication, but the bright 
lines drawn by rules sometimes create substantive inequality by lumping 
together people who are not similarly situated.204 On the other hand, 
standards can conceal arbitrariness in decision-making because it is always 
possible to point to some ostensibly relevant factor differentiating two 
otherwise similar cases.205 It has been a long time since anyone has thought 
about antitrust in explicitly moral terms,206 but whatever the content of 
antitrust, courts must make some effort to apply it evenly.  The risk of 
arbitrary and inconsistent results in a standard-based system increases with 
the complexity of the law administered and the unsophistication of the 
ultimate decision-maker.   Much of antitrust law is highly complex, and 
juries—which are more likely to be entrusted with decisions under 
standards than under rules207—are often in over their heads in economically 
complicated antitrust cases.  These factors create the conditions for 
adjudicatory arbitrariness.  In Section III(C), I discussed the allocation of 
decision-making responsibilities that comes with the choice of rules or 
standards further, suggesting that standards tend to push more ultimate 
decision-making onto jurors.  If we are concerned about disparate treatment 
of similarly situated parties, there is something to be said for maintaining 
antitrust rules. 
 
B. Maintaining the Expressive Core 
 
In thinking about the optimal specification of legal commands, it is 
important to keep in mind how the legal commands will communicate the 
 
204 See Sullivan, supra n. xxx at 62; Davis, supra n. xxx at v (arguing that “the 
greatest and most frequent injustice occurs at the discretion end of the scale, where 
rules and principles provide no or little guidance, where emotions of deciding 
officers may affect what they do, where political or other favoritism may influence 
decisions, and where the imperfections of human nature are often rejected in the 
choices made). 
205 Posner, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra n. xxx at 44. 
206 No less an authority than Herbert Hovenkamp informs us that “antitrust has no 
moral content.”  Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 
J. Corp. L. 607, 609 (2003); but see Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the 
Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 86-87 (1999) (describing turn-of-the-century 
view that prices at a competitive level were part of a “natural” order and that 
deviations from that price through monopolistic or collusive conduct were a moral 
wrong). 
207 See supra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx. 
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core values of the relevant legal enterprise both to regulated entities and the 
general public. As Thurman Arnold wrote a few years before transforming 
the Antitrust Division into a modern, aggressive agency, law plays an 
important role in expressing contradictory social values.208 Nowhere is this 
more evident than in a case like Socony, which Arnold pressed on behalf of 
the United States.  The “dancing partner” arrangement among the 
Midwestern oil refiners challenged by the Government had been instigated 
by the Administrator of the Petroleum Administration Board that was 
created by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to a federal statute and an 
executive order of President Roosevelt.209 After the Supreme Court 
invalidated key portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act,210 the 
Department of Justice turned on the dancing partner program as a price fix.  
The shift from federal instigation to federal condemnation happened in 
heartbeat and it was left to the federal courts to work out the contradiction.  
Justice Douglas found that solution in the enunciation of a sweeping per se 
prohibition on price fixing, a decree so strong that the reasonableness of the 
defendants’ conduct in light of the regulatory apparatus of a few weeks 
earlier was utterly irrelevant.211 
Although antitrust practioners have come to think of antitrust as a 
generally bureaucratic discipline at the public enforcement level and a 
complex field for expert lawyers and economists at the private enforcement 
level, antitrust will always symbolize to the public at large certain values of 
capitalism and its restraints.212 Even if most lawyers, judges, or business 
people do not think of antitrust in moral terms,213 the enforcement agencies 
go out of their way to depict core antitrust violations as malum in se. In 
press releases, the Attorney General solemnly informs the public that price 
fixing “robs American consumers of the benefit of competitive prices,”214 
208 THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935). 
209 310 U.S. at 171-74. 
210 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corporation v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
211 310 U.S. at 221-222.  Justice Douglas dismissed  the governmentally mandated 
origins of the distress gasoline program, saying:  “Though employees of the 
government may have known of those programs and winked at them or tacitly 
approved them, no immunity would have thereby been obtained.”  Id. at 226. 
212 As Bob Pitofsky reminds us, antitrust has always had, and will always have, a 
political content.  Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1051 (1979). 
213 See supra n. xxx. 
214 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Samsung Agrees to Plead Guilty and to 
Pay $300 Million Criminal Fine for Role in Price Fixing Conspiracy (Oct. 13. 
2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/212002.htm. 
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just as surely as if the price-fixers had walked into a bank with a drawn gun.  
If price fixing is to be analogized (when convenient) to robbery, it will do 
no good to explain that this is only true at the end of the collaborative 
restraints of trade continuum where the defendant has failed to rebut a 
prima facie assumption that the conduct in question causes social welfare 
losses.  Price fixing is only “robbery” if price fixing is prohibited—period.  
Simply articulated rules about what is categorically permitted are also 
necessary to express the competition preference of capitalism.  Rules are 
needed as bookends to the range of possible legal outcomes.  If price fixing 
is categorically prohibited, then perhaps refusing to collaborate with 
competitors should be categorically allowed.215 This allows antitrust to be 
reduced to a maxim like “competition, not collusion” which expresses the 
heart of the enterprise to the laity even if antitrust insiders experience the 
rules as somewhat fuzzier. 
 Antitrust law needs to maintain a rule-expressed core not only for the 
general public but also for the constituencies whose behavior it regulates.  
Business schools seem to teach very little about antitrust.216 Larry White 
reports that nine leading business school microeconomics textbooks 
devoted a total of 64 pages out of 6,421 to antitrust principles.217 Business 
people frequently profess surprise—real or feigned—when told that their 
conduct violated the antitrust laws.218 If all of antitrust breaks down into 
amorphous standards, it will be even easier for business schools to shunt all 
of antitrust off to the lawyers. 
In order to maintain the expressive core of antitrust law, the Supreme 
Court should take care to ensure that, even in a generally standard-based 
system, at least a few principles of antitrust law remain enunciated as black-
letter rules.  One could imagine a canon of antitrust rules along the 
following lines:  (1)  If you fix prices with your competitor, you will go to 
 
215 In Trinko, the Supreme Court came close to ruling that firms never have an 
obligation to cooperate with their competitors, although it avoided overruling 
Aspen Skiing which did recognize such an obligation in the facts of that case. See 
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
408-10 (2004). 
216 See Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights from Strategic Management, 47 
N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 67, 73 (2003); Lawrence J. White, Microeconomics in MBA 
Programs:  What’s Thought, What’s Taught, 47 N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 87, 91-95 (2003). 
217 White, supra n. xxx at 94-95. 
218 Even in a hard-core price-fixing case like the Christie’s/Sotheby’s agreements 
on seller’s commissions, some of the high-ranking executives involved expressed 
surprise that their conduct was illegal.  See CHRISTOPHER MASON, ART OF THE 
STEAL (2004).  One does not have to believe their protestations to appreciate the 
value of clearly delineated rules in removing the excuse. 
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jail; (2) Do not divide markets with your competitors—you must compete!; 
(3) You have no obligation to cooperate with your competitors; (4) You 
may set your price as high or as low as you please, but not below your cost; 
(5) If your market share exceeds 70%, you are a monopolist—watch 
yourself! These or other similar principles could be enunciated as simple 
rules, thus maintaining the expressive core of antitrust, even if practitioners 
realize that the rules are not as determinate as they appear on paper.   
CONCLUSION 
In many ways, antitrust’s transition from a categorical ex ante approach 
to a more open-ended, multi-factor, and post-hoc approach resembles the 
development of Anglo-American common law.  The system started with a 
number of relatively narrow and formalistic rules (compare the per se rules 
to the common law writs); eventually the needs of the relevant constituency 
outgrew the boundaries of the rules; the courts essentially froze the rules 
and refused to create new categories; new modes of adjudication were 
required and found their place in a flexible system of “equity;” equity and 
law competed for some time until the flexibility of equity overcame the 
rigidity of law; eventually law and equity collapsed into a single system, 
with the spirit of equity predominating.219 To a large extent, this narrative 
describes where we have been, and where we appear to be headed, in 
antitrust adjudication. 
It is easy to recount a rules-to-standards story as a saga of progress,  
and there is much to be said in favor of antitrust law’s transition toward 
standards, particularly because there was much to be said against many of 
the old rules.  But the deficiencies of the old rules should not mislead us to 
believe that antitrust standards are always superior to antitrust rules or that a 
system of flexible standards can be maintained without a core of bright-line 
rules.  As noted at the outset, the legal pendulum usually swings back and 
forth between rules and standards as the disadvantages of the prevailing 
regime lead to calls for reform. The best way to prevent such cycles and 
maintain long-term flexibility where it most matters is to preserve a rule-
based structure for significant portions of the antitrust endeavor. 
In deciding between rules and standards, it is critical to keep in mind 
the remedial and legal-cultural settings in which antitrust law intersects 
with litigants and prospective litigants.  The trend toward open-ended rule 
of reason analysis makes good sense when applied to the Federal Trade 
 
219 See generally Davis, supra n. xxx at 19; FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND,
EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (1910). 
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Commission or Department of Justice when they seek to alter future 
behavior.  It makes less sense when applied to treble damages actions by 
rent-seeking private litigants, which raises the danger of overdeterrence and 
strategic misuse of the unpredictability created by multi-factored standards.  
There is still an important place in antitrust jurisprudence for defensive 
safe-harbors formed by bright-line rules.  And, in order to maintain the 
expressive core of antitrust, a few per se prohibitions and per se rules of 
legality should be maintained. 
Justice Marshall was wrong to view economic analysis of industrial 
practices as an untamable wild, but he was right to recognize the 
advantages of rules.  We do not have to return to Topco’s rigidity to 
preserve a space for dynamic rules in antitrust adjudication. 
